INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME by Stafford, Scott
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-12
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF ALBANIAN
ORGANIZED CRIME
Stafford, Scott
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61277
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Thesis Advisor: Ryan Gingeras 
Co-Advisor: David S. Yost 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 December 2018  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Scott Stafford 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 This thesis investigates Albanian organized crime with a focus on the transnational crime of trafficking 
cannabis cultivated in Albania. It argues that the illicit cannabis market has flourished due to a difficult 
transition from communism to democracy, and efforts to combat the market, until recently, have been 
largely an afterthought by government officials. Additionally, organized crime has infiltrated portions of 
Albanian politics and its economy, which has had significant negative effects on Albania, its citizens, and its 
candidacy toward European Union (EU) membership. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Albania, organized, crime, cannabis, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, United 
States, Nations, European Union, UN, EU, UK, Balkans, corruption, terrorism, non-state, 
armed, groups 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 99 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 
Scott Stafford 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
BSBA, California State University, Long Beach, 2002 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(EUROPE AND EURASIA) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2018 
Approved by: Ryan Gingeras 
Advisor 
David S. Yost 
Co-Advisor 
Afshon P. Ostovar 
Associate Chair for Research 
Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates Albanian organized crime with a focus on the 
transnational crime of trafficking cannabis cultivated in Albania. It argues that the illicit 
cannabis market has flourished due to a difficult transition from communism to 
democracy, and efforts to combat the market, until recently, have been largely an 
afterthought by government officials. Additionally, organized crime has infiltrated 
portions of Albanian politics and its economy, which has had significant negative effects 
on Albania, its citizens, and its candidacy toward European Union (EU) membership. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the following question: How does organized crime in Albania 
affect its relationships with neighboring countries, the European Union (EU), and other 
institutions, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Albania is a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership. Albania is 
arguably one of the most pro-Western (i.e., Western Europe and the United States) Balkan 
states. When Albania joined NATO in 2009, all major political parties supported 
membership and as many as 96 percent of its citizens did as well.1 A 2015 study showed 
that 92 percent of citizens viewed EU membership as beneficial to Albania.2 Albania is 
pro-West, but it remains an extremely poor country that has historically been susceptible 
to political corruption and crime. This makes Albania an intriguing subject considering that 
Albania’s strong desire to join the EU and adopt Western political models directly contrasts 
with the state’s dysfunctional democratic institutions and uneven rule of law. 
The research question takes into account the complexities of Albanian integration 
with the West while focusing on the country’s struggle to combat organized crime, an 
extremely broad category of activity in Albania. To avoid an overly broad analysis, this 
thesis focuses on the illicit Albanian markets of cannabis production and trafficking. 
Cannabis is unique because the level of actual harm the drug is responsible for is heavily 
debated. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argues that this debate 
has resulted in inconsistencies in the severity of cannabis laws and cannabis law 
                                                 
1 Vincent Morelli et al., NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates, CRS 
Report No. RL34701 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2009), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL34701.pdf, 5.  
2 Klodjan Seferaj et al., National Survey on Perceptions and Exceptions towards a Potential EU 




enforcement.3 As a result, the drug has become a uniquely suitable product for 
transnational organized crime. If Albanian organized crime has indeed hurt the country’s 
relations with European governments and international organizations, as evidence 
suggests, this thesis investigates how severe the impacts have been and the role the illicit 
cannabis market has played in this respect. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Efforts to Define Organized Crime 
Jana Arsovska, the author of Decoding Albanian Organized Crime, provides a 
detailed account of many Albanian criminal groups, but she rejects the idea of a singular 
Albanian mafia.4 Her skepticism about the existence of an Albanian mafia, in conjunction 
with acknowledgment of Albanian organized crime, brings up an interesting question. How 
does organized crime function in Albania without a mafia-like command structure? The 
answer lies in the applicable definition of the mafia and organized crime. 
The term “mafia” originates from Sicily, but its exact meaning and origin are 
contested among historians and scholars.5 Public acknowledgement of Italian mafia-
related crime in the United States dates back as far as 1890, but it was not until after World 
War II that federal agencies identified, and began to develop policies to combat, a 
nationwide criminal organization referred to as the mafia.6 Following the release of the 
novel and movie The Godfather, in 1969 and 1972, respectively, the “mafia” became a 
familiar word in American households. Since then, the word has developed many 
variations and is often used haphazardly to describe any group engaged in organized crime. 
                                                 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2006 (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations, 2006), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf, 155–57. 
4 Jana Arsovska, Decoding Albanian Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization (Oakland, 
CA: University of California Press, 2015). 
5 Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 22–40. 
6 Letizia Paoli, “The Paradoxes of Organized Crime,” Crime, Law and Social Change 37, no. 1 
(2002): 51–97. 
3 
This common misapplication of the term “mafia” adds confusion in the larger debate on 
how to define organized crime.  
In reviewing definitions of organized crime, Jay Albanese wrote, “there seem to be 
as many descriptions of organized crime as there are authors.”7 The Oxford English 
Dictionary provides the following definition: 
organized crime n. crime which is deliberately planned and not petty or 
opportunistic; spec. crime which is planned and controlled by powerful 
groups and carried out on a large scale; the groups who perpetrate this kind 
of crime.8 
Using the Oxford definition, the term organized crime appears fairly self-
explanatory. That is, it consists of crimes that are organized and committed by groups. 
However, among many scholars, the definition of organized crime begins with 
distinguishing whether organized crime is defined by the criminal groups involved, or by 
the specific criminal activities.9 In other words, is organized crime defined by the 
perpetrators or by the severity of their offenses? The Oxford definition combines crime 
participants (i.e., “powerful groups”) and crime severity (“large scale”). 
The definition of organized crime can be viewed as a spectrum which ranges from 
precise to vague characteristics. The Oxford definition applies required traits to organized 
crime and can thus be thought of as a precise definition. In a similar fashion, the scholar 
Howard Abadinsky identifies eight attributes which indicate the illicit activities that qualify 
as organized crime.10 On the other side of the spectrum, scholars such as Letizia Paoli have 
argued that, contrary to popular belief, organized crime often happens in disorganized 
ways.11 Furthermore, she acknowledged that while large powerful groups (e.g., the mafia) 
                                                 
7 Jay S. Albanese, Organized Crime in America (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company, 
1985), 4.  
8 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “organized crime,” accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/132457?redirectedFrom=organized+crime#eid33332775. 
9 Letizia Paoli and Cyrille Fijnaut, “General Introduction,” in Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, 
Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (The 
Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 7. 
10 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc, 1990). 
11 Paoli, “The Paradoxes of Organized Crime.” 
4 
do exist, they rarely operate as a single unit. Paoli notes the challenge to assigning a one-
size-fits-all definition of organized crime, which aligns her with the scholars who believe 
the term can often be vague and subjective.12 
Despite the disagreements about defining organized crime, combatting it has 
become a top priority throughout the world. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice 
employs its Organized Crime and Gang Section (OCGS) against organized crime,13 the 
UNODC promotes a global response to organized crime,14 and the European Union’s 
police force (Europol) publishes the Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA) to address major crimes.15  
Ironically, with all the attention organized crime receives, rarely do institutions 
define organized crime in the same way even if they use precise definitions. Law 
enforcement agencies benefit from a specific definition because it provides them with 
precise attributes to measure and target. That being said, these institutions narrow their 
focus in different ways. For example, both the EU and the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) specify that organized crime is perpetrated by structured groups. While 
the EU is specific on minimum group size, the FBI is not.16 Moreover, the FBI lists specific 
offenses that are typical of organized crime while the EU does not specify any particular 
crimes. Rather, the EU lists applicable punishments. In summary, even specific definitions 
of organized crime will have elements of subjectivity. 
                                                 
12 Both book chapters discuss the difficulty and subjective nature of defining organized crime, Paoli 
and Fijnaut, “General Introduction”; Felia Allum, “Introduction,” in Routledge Handbook of Transnational 
Organized Crime, F. Allum and S. Gilmour (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1–15. 
13 “Organized Crime and Gang Section (OCGS),” The United States Department of Justice, August 
18, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ocgs. 
14 “Organized Crime,” United Nations Officer on Drugs and Crime, accessed February 16, 2018, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html. 
15 “Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): Identifying the Priorities in the Fight 
Against Major Crime,” EUROPOL, accessed February 16, 2018, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-
services/main-reports/serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment. 
16 The EU definition refers to a structured association of “more than two persons” where the FBI 
definition gives no number. Allum, “Introduction.” 6–7. 
5 
2. The Effects of Organized Crime 
If organized crime is defined differently by institutions, it stands to reason that the 
perceived effects of organized crime will also differ from region to region. In the case of 
the EU, a group of fewer than three people engaged in extortion, by definition, does not 
qualify as organized crime. However, in the United States, the same group may be charged 
with engaging in organized crime because the FBI definition does not define group size. 
As a result, the documented effects of organized crime in the EU can contrast with those 
in the United States because of a different definition. 
Studying the effects of something that is not easily defined poses a challenge to 
scholars. In order to circumvent this challenge, many scholars avoid trying to establish a 
firm definition of organized crime, and instead, use case studies to explore how organized 
crime is defined, opposed, and measured by individual states. 
In the case of the Netherlands, Edward Kleemans reports that organized crime was 
not addressed until the 1990s, but upon the determination that it was a concern, the state 
overreacted.17 Rather than study the issue empirically, it was assumed that organized crime 
was made up of Dutch criminal syndicates, capable of taking over economic sectors and 
political institutions, and that it could potentially affect the stability of the state. After 
further review, these assumptions proved inaccurate, and it was discovered that criminal 
networks in the Netherlands were primarily active in the trafficking of illicit goods. The 
networks were developed largely from the diverse immigrant population in the 
Netherlands. Specifically, immigrants who emigrated from countries that are now sources 
for illicit products (e.g., heroin from Turkey or hashish from Morocco) were often involved 
in the trafficking of those products. These “transit crimes,” as they are described by 
Kleeman, are largely aided by the social ties between the immigrants and criminals in their 
countries of origin. The crimes are unlikely to destabilize the Netherlands, but their cross-
border nature has international implications.  
                                                 
17 Edward Kleemans, “Crossing Borders: Organized Crime in the Netherlands,” in Organized Crime 
in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, C. Fijnaut and L. 
Paoli (The Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 303–31. 
6 
France, like the Netherlands, began to address organized crime in the 1990s, but 
France has had an almost opposite reaction. Nacer Lalam observes that historical research 
has uncovered evidence of two periods after World War II of French organized crime that 
resembles family or clan structures.18 Although the research indicates that similar 
structures continue to exist in France today, according to Lalam, in the public debate, 
France views organized crime as a threat from foreign mafias. He also states that in French 
academia, “the subject of organized crime has never gained full legitimacy.”19 Lalam 
describes an overall pessimistic attitude in France towards the notion of French organized 
crime groups and potential investments of illegal profits in the legal economy. Without 
more focused efforts, determining the effects of French organized crime will remain 
challenging. 
A further extreme, beyond France, is found in Spain, where there was almost no 
state-sponsored research on organized crime and no organized crime legislation as of 
2004.20 In contrast, Italy has specific laws targeting criminal organizations; and countless 
books, articles, and other scholarly works have investigated the effects of Italian organized 
crime inside Italy’s borders and beyond. The same cannot be said for Albania. However, 
due to the sharp rise in Albanian drug trafficking since the 1990s, the country has received 
a significant increase in attention. Reports from the UNODC, the EU, and other 
international institutions are plentiful and help to analyze the domestic and international 
effects of Albanian organized crime. 
3. Organized Crime as an Economy 
Many studies of organized crime explore how the activities of criminal groups work 
inside and outside legally regulated state activities. One way of studying this phenomenon 
                                                 
18 Nacer Lalam, “How Organised Is Organised Crime in France,” in Organized Crime in Europe: 
Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (The 
Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 357–85. 
19 Lalam, 357. 
20 Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes and Per Stangeland, “Spain: The Flourishing Illegal Drug Haven in 
Europe,” in Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union 
and Beyond, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (The Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 387–412. 
7 
is to treat organized crime as a business. In his “criminal enterprise approach,” Jay 
Albanese treats organized crime as analogous to legal enterprises, stating that both share 
the goals of survival and profit.21 In this model, the illicit enterprise experiences the same 
factors as a normal business. Both enterprises (legal and illegal) have suppliers and 
customers, and must contend with regulators and competitors. This model helps one 
conceptualize scenarios in which illegal and legal businesses meet. For example, an illegal 
enterprise may invest profits in legal businesses to circumvent regulators. In another 
example, a legal enterprise may purchase stolen goods at discounted prices, allowing it to 
sell the goods at lower prices than its legal competitors. 
Albanese’s economic approach has utility in evaluating for-profit crime, but some 
scholars maintain that not all organized crime is economically driven. Arguments have 
been made that the Italian mafias, Cosa Nostra and N’drangheta, the Chinese Triads, and 
the Japanese Yakuza have never viewed illegal trade and profit as primary goals but instead 
prioritize their social status and the traditions associated with membership.22 Additionally, 
while terrorist organizations are viewed as entities separate from organized crime groups 
by the United Nations (UN) and other institutions,23 some scholars have found it useful to 
study terrorist organizations for insight on organized crime. Scholars have explored 
commonalities between the organizational structures of both types of groups and 
investigated operational links between the two entities.24 These studies provide additional 
insight as to what motivates criminals, but that does not render Albanese’s model 
irrelevant. Even if the ultimate driving force behind certain types of organized crime is not 
profit, profit is still an inevitable requirement to maintain a functioning organization. 
                                                 
21 Jay S. Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption, and 
Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54–57. 
22 Letizia Paoli, “Organised Crime in Italy: Mafia and Illegal Markets - Exception and Normality,” in 
Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, 
C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (The Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 274. 
23 See UN definition of organized crime in Felia Allum, “Introduction,” 7. 
24 William J. Chambliss and Elizabeth Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and Social Sciences 
Myths,” in Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, ed. F. Allum and S. Gilmour (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 52–64; Angela Gendron, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Global 
Networks in Pursuit of Plunder; Global Alliances in Pursuit of Plunderers,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Transnational Organized Crime, ed. F. Allum and S. Gilmour (New York: Routledge, 2011), 403–17. 
8 
By focusing on economics, as Albanese does, some case studies of Russian 
organized crime have identified interactions of legal and illegal functions in the state. A 
common narrative in these studies is one in which entrepreneurial groups, both criminal 
and non-criminal, took advantage of an unregulated market and weak law enforcement 
practices in the late 1980s to the early 1990s, as Russian society transitioned from a planned 
economy to a market economy.25 The transition period from communism to capitalism left 
a void in the economy that was filled by non-state groups active in operating industries, 
establishing private bank services, and investing in public foundations, all outside the limits 
of the law. By the time substantive laws and regulations were established for the new 
political-economic structure, illicit organizations had deeply infiltrated the Russian 
economy and were capable of influencing politics, law enforcement, and social institutions.  
Albania’s story has been similar to that of Russia; organized crime rose during the 
volatile transition from a planned economy to a liberal market economy. However, the 
stories diverge because, unlike Russia, Albania was not an industrial power. Therefore, 
while the stories told in Russian case studies are ones of supply, Albanian case studies are 
ones of demand. Criminal groups in Russia were able to capitalize on the transition by 
infiltrating or duplicating the vast legal economic activities of the state. The transition to a 
market economy in Albania resembled that of a collapsed state, in which criminal groups 
benefited from demands for economic and social institutions that essentially were non-
existent.26 Therefore, while the Russian case studies focus heavily on economic driving 
factors behind organized crime, the Albanian cases appear to represent a hybrid involving 
economics, politics, and basic social needs. 
                                                 
25 Serguei Cheloukhine, “Transnational Organized Crime in Russia,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Transnational Organized Crime, ed. F. Allum and S. Gilmour (New York: Routledge, 2011), 111–26; 
Louise Shelley, “Contemporary Russian Organised Crime: Embedded in Russian Society,” in Organized 
Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, C. Fijnaut 
and L. Paoli (The Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 563–84; Vadim Volkov, “The Russian Mafia: Rise and 
Extinction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, ed. Letizia Paoli (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 159–76. 
26 Vasilika Hysi, “Organised Crime in Albania: The Ugly Side of Capitalism and Democracy,” in 
Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, 
ed. C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (The Netherlands: Springer, 2004), 537–62; Jana Arsovska, Decoding Albanian 
Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization, 29–30. 
9 
4. Transnational Organized Crime 
Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a combination of two concepts that are 
difficult to define: organized crime, and transnational crime. As previously discussed, 
organized crime is difficult to define because the levels of sophistication, the size of 
organizations, and the seriousness of offenses vary from group to group. Transnational 
crime, which crosses borders, is sometimes confused with international crime. The 
difference (which is somewhat counterintuitive) is that international crime does not need 
to cross borders. In Albanese’s words, “International crimes are crimes against the peace 
and security of mankind based on international agreements or based on legal precedents 
developed through history.”27 An example of international crime is an act of genocide, 
which can be committed within the borders of one state but violates international law. 
By combining the two terms into one, the concept of TOC can take on multiple 
forms ranging from human smuggling to terrorism depending on how one views organized 
crime and transnational crime. Terrorism is often excluded by institutions that view the 
pursuit of financial profits as integral to organized crime. The UN is an example of such 
an institution. The UN defines organized crime and then explains the context in which 
organized crime becomes transnational. The UN definition of organized crime has four 
elements: structure, duration, crime severity, and financial motivation.28 Some elements 
are specific while some are vague. The UN states that organized crime becomes 
transnational when it meets any of the following criteria: it is committed in multiple states, 
it is planned in one state and committed in another, it is committed by an organized criminal 
group operating in multiple states, or the effects of the crime cross state lines.29 However, 
if one considers Paoli’s argument that organized crime is sometimes done to attain (or 
                                                 
27 Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption, and 
Opportunity, 3. 
28 United Nations, “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (New York: United Nations, 2004), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf, 5. 
29 United Nations, 6. 
10 
maintain) social status rather than to pursue profits,30 the distinction between terrorism and 
TOC can become less obvious.  
Despite the debate surrounding the terms that make up TOC, the term itself has 
achieved global attention. Concerns about TOC have been expressed by diverse 
institutions, including the EU, the UN, and the FBI. The origins of these concerns are often 
credited to the United States for the public acknowledgment of the Italian mafia in the last 
half of the 20th century, and for vocal suspicions of the mafia’s transnational activities.31 
While many scholars criticize the U.S. reaction to the mafia as overly sensationalized by 
politicians and the media, most scholars of organized crime point to globalization as a key 
driving force behind organized crime graduating to transnational organized crime.32  
By 1994, the UN had placed the term TOC on the international stage by 
acknowledging it at the World Ministerial Conference in Naples, Italy.33 Since then, the 
UN has refined its definition and adopted the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. The convention was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 2000. It entered into force in 2003, and 188 countries are 
now party to it.34  
5. Organized Crime in International Relations 
Research into how both organized crime and TOC affect international relations has 
naturally evolved as international institutions have voiced concerns about illicit activities 
that cross borders between states. Scholars have argued that organized crime in Russia is 
involved in the economics and politics of the state.35 They insist that this involvement not 
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only concerns states that have relationships with Russia, but that it also hurts Russia’s 
standing in international politics. Similar arguments have been made about Italy, where the 
mafia has infiltrated businesses and political structures in the state. While the Italian state 
has ratified conventions to tackle transnational crime, some experts hold that the state did 
so under pressure and does not have the proper social conditions (e.g., low unemployment 
and a low level of corruption) to fully enforce the new measures.36 
 With regard to Albania, organized crime is a recurring theme as the state 
aspires to achieve EU membership and is examined annually by the European 
Commission.37 Arsovska does not deny that Albanian organized crime has spread globally, 
but she maintains that the perceived threat of Albanian transnational crime is overstated in 
Western societies.38 Nevertheless, Albania is singled out routinely by institutions like the 
UNODC and described as a major actor in the trafficking of illicit goods and services in 
European states, complicating the country’s attempts to engage with the global economy.39  
D. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis puts forward the following two hypotheses: 
First, there exists a significant level of organized crime within, and emanating from, 
the Albanian state. Albanian organized crime is not formed by a rigid hierarchical group 
with a few powerful bosses like the Italian mafia. Rather it is similar, in some respects, to 
the Netherlands model, in that social and ethnic ties based on national origins help form 
criminal networks that produce and traffic illicit goods. Additionally, Albanian organized 
crime has also benefited from a lack of governmental attention and serious law 
                                                 
36 Armando D’Alterio, “The Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime in Italy: What Can We 
Learn?,” in Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, F. Allum and S. Gilmour (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 470–82. 
37 “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,” European Commission, June 12, 
2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania_en. 
38 Arsovska, Decoding Albanian Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization, 232–235. 
39 An examples is Albanian cannabis smuggling noted in the following reports: UNODC, World Drug 
Report 2006. 165. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Market Analysis of Plant-Based Drugs: 
Opiates, Cocaine, Cannabis,” World Drug Report 2017 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017), 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_3_Plantbased.pdf, 40. 
12 
enforcement, much like organized crime in Spain. Political corruption and weak state 
institutions have allowed criminal markets, notably cannabis production and trafficking, to 
become a substantial factor in the Albanian economy; and an elimination of the cannabis 
market may lead to complex economic consequences if social safety nets and employment 
opportunities are not available to fill the economic void.  
Second, Albanian transnational crime will continue to be a primary concern for 
international institutions and for national governments that view it as a threat to their 
borders. The trafficking of Albanian cannabis complicates the drug enforcement efforts of 
many countries throughout the globe, and drug trafficking profits can also fund other illicit 
activities that cross state borders. NATO and the EU have interests in the stability of 
Albania and the honesty and effectiveness of its state agencies, considering its membership 
in NATO and its potential membership in the EU. Therefore, the harmful and destabilizing 
nature of the cannabis market is of particular interest to these international institutions.  
13 
II. ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 
This chapter argues that the fall of communism in Albania and its turbulent 
transition to democracy left Albanian organized crime largely unchecked for many years, 
leading to TOC and a massive illicit cannabis market. The cannabis market in Albania has 
had numerous negative effects on Albania externally and internally. Externally, there is 
international pressure on the state because of its illicit trade. Internally, the state suffers 
from destabilizing effects such as corruption, political power struggles, and an informal 
economic system—termed a “gray economy”—that creates a cycle in which crime and 
corruption lead to economic harm, which further promotes dishonesty and graft.  
A. THE RISE OF ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 
As Albania started down the turbulent path of democratization, organized crime 
spread rapidly. The removal of communism eliminated the economic safety net of the 
planned economy that was supporting many Albanians. Albania was Europe’s least 
developed nation in the 1990s, leading to significant unemployment and inflation.40 Crime 
became a way for many Albanians to obtain wealth in the struggling economy. In the early 
1990s, there was a sharp increase in violent crime as well as other organized crimes 
involving stolen cars, prostitution, and drugs.41 Viselike Haysi argues that in the first years 
of the transition, increasing organized crime was mostly ignored because the primary focus 
of the Albanian people was on state building.42 
The unimpeded spread of organized crime in Albania was primarily due to political 
corruption, an outdated criminal code, and inadequate law enforcement. Corruption in 
Albanian politics in the 1990s was partly due to politicians that were supported by clans. 
According to Arsovska, if a member of a clan ran for a political position, he would receive 
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support from every clan associate.43 If the politician was elected, he was then bound to 
support all clan members (including criminals) in return. 
On a larger scale, since democratizing, Albanian politics have been dominated by 
two parties: the right-wing Democratic Party (DP) and the left-wing Socialist Party (SP). 
Additionally, since 2004 a third party, the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI), has 
served as a coalition partner for both the DP and SP to establish a majority.44 Concerns 
over links between Albanian politicians within the major parties and organized crime have 
been numerous. In 2009, U.S. Ambassador John Withers stated, “the three major parties, 
the Democratic Party (DP), the Socialist Party (SP) and the Movement for Social 
Integration (LSI), all have MPs with links to organized crime.”45 These links were a 
catalyst to the spread of organized crime in Albania and have had destabilizing effects on 
the state which will be discussed later. 
The outdated criminal code was due to distraction followed by slow adaptation. 
Due to the focus on democratization, the concept of organized crime was not even 
discussed in Albania until 1993.46 Until that point, and for the following two years, Albania 
used a criminal code that was created by the former communist regime in 1977.47 When 
the new Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania was established in 1995, it required 
multiple amendments because it was immediately obsolete. The criminal code addressed 
sexual exploitation of women and children, but it had no punishments for the traffickers or 
facilitators of the crime.48 Punishment for arms trafficking was also lacking. Arms 
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trafficking was not amended to the criminal code until 2001.49 This was excessively late, 
considering that the economic collapse in 1997 led to large scale looting of military 
weapons. Estimates of looted weapons in 1997 range from ½ to 1 million small arms and 
800 million to 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition as well as 16 million explosive devices.50 
With such an extreme number of weapons in the hands of criminals and looters, it would 
have been prudent for the government to anticipate an increase of arms trafficking. Instead, 
it took the government four years to respond. 
Albania has built up its criminal code, albeit slowly, and has ratified numerous 
international conventions on organized crime and TOC. However, the laws mean little if 
they cannot be enforced. A 2003 European Commission report stated, “Albania’s capacity 
and determination to fight organised crime remains limited.”51 The report also observed 
that police capability is limited, and that co-operation between police and departments 
within the judicial institution was lacking. In 2017, the Council of Europe issued a report 
commending Albania for recent constitutional amendments to reform the judiciary but still 
remarked, “the insufficient independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Albania and 
the political pressure and interference on it have been longstanding concerns of the 
Assembly.”52 Regardless of how many laws Albania has drafted, organized crime has 
easily spread due to lack of enforcement. 
B. ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME ACROSS BORDERS 
The steep rise in organized crime in Albania is typically correlated to the volatile 
transition from a planned economy to a liberal market economy in the 1990s. Although this 
is correct, some Albanian organized crime roots were in place well before the state 
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democratized. Furthermore, much of the criminal activity that predates democracy was 
transnational because it took place beyond the borders of the small communist state. 
Arsovska cites multiple reports about the Albanian communist security agencies using 
professional criminals, typically in Western Europe, for a variety of services, including 
informing, assassinations, and smuggling weapons and oil.53 She also discusses evidence 
showing that the secret police—the Sigurimi—had government-approved agreements with 
the Italian mafia to provide safe havens and assistance with cigarette trafficking in order to 
raise profits for Albania. Arsovska points out that many of the government officials and 
Sigurimi involved in these activities were removed from service as the democratic party 
came to power. She argues that without employment, many of them turned to TOC, which 
they were already proficient in, to support themselves financially. 
Albanian TOC was also found in New York before the democratization of Albania. 
Albanians who had escaped their communist homeland came to the United States in large 
numbers in the 1960s.54 Arsovska reports that some Albanians began importing heroin 
from Yugoslavia.55 The drugs were distributed through neighborhood stores, and evidence 
suggests that by the 1980s the Albanian criminals began cooperating with the Italian mafia. 
Organized crime within Albania in the early 1990s also began to cross international 
borders. Albanian TOC groups have been active in human smuggling, human trafficking, 
and the trafficking of weapons, cars, and drugs.56 Arms trafficking became popular after 
the 1997 economic collapse. Arsovska argues that many of the weapons looted in 1997 
were trafficked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the Kosovo conflict, and that 
additional weapons were transported to the ethnic Albanians responsible for the Macedonia 
insurgency in 2001.57 Illegal export of stolen automobiles was also a crime that 
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experienced an increase in the late 1990s.58 Additionally, drug cultivation and trafficking 
became a rapidly growing industry during the democratic transition of the country. Albania 
acts as a transit state for many drugs, and cannabis has become a major product produced 
in Albania and trafficked abroad. 
C. THE ALBANIAN CANNABIS MARKET 
According to multiple sources, Albanian cannabis production and trafficking began 
in the 1990s as the People’s Republic of Albania dissolved.59 Jana Arsovska provides 
evidence that many dismissed members of the Sigurimi turned to smuggling drugs as a 
source of income, but cannabis is not specifically mentioned.60 A 1999 International Crisis 
Group (ICG) report asserts that, initially, individual farmers engaged in cannabis 
cultivation and sales, and the business later expanded as drug traffickers from Italy invested 
in the market.61 Nonetheless, whether the Albanian cannabis market was initially a product 
of organized criminal groups, or simply local farmers, the general consensus is that the 
market dates back to the start of the 1990s. 
The increase of the Albanian cannabis market since the 1990s has attained global 
recognition. Before government eradication efforts in 2014, the southern Albanian village 
of Lazarat was referred to as “the drug capital of Europe.”62 In addition to many news 
agency reports, the cannabis market has been noted by multiple international institutions. 
In 1999, the ICG wrote that “Albania has become the epicentre of a new Golden Triangle 
that has formed in south-eastern Europe for the transit and production of drugs.”63 The 
UNODC acknowledged Albania as “a major exporter of herbal cannabis” in 2006.64 
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Additionally, the European Union identified Albania’s cannabis market in its 2016 review 
on the state.65 
Attempts to combat the cannabis market have been historically inconsistent but 
have increased significantly in the last four years. In 1995, Albanian police destroyed 
approximately 100,000 cannabis plants.66 In 2002, Albanian police seized 13,717 kg of 
cannabis herb and 155,678 plants.67 Efforts then began to recede on both fronts. Data from 
the UNODC shows that cannabis herb seizures fell dramatically over the next two years 
and plant seizures also declined.68 According to the UNODC’s figures, it was not until 
2008, when plant seizures climbed to 145,000, that Albanian authorities nearly reached 
2002 levels. However, cannabis herb seizures, which had slowly been climbing since 2005, 
decreased by more than two thirds. Over the next four years, the UNODC’s figures show 
that the situation essentially reversed as 2012 plant seizures fell to 33,000, while cannabis 
herb seizures jumped to over 20,000 kg. Albania has since dramatically increased its efforts 
to combat the cannabis market. In 2014, Albanian police seized over 100 tons of cannabis 
herb, which equated to more than all the cannabis seized in the previous 9 years 
combined.69 In late 2016, police reported that they had destroyed 800,000 cannabis plants 
in 2015, and they had already doubled that number in the first nine months of 2016.70 
However, despite the increased efforts of Albanian officials, the UNODC still identified 
Albania as the main European source of cannabis in 2017, along with the Netherlands.71 
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Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama takes issue with reports like the one from the 
UNODC and has claimed that cannabis cultivation is nearly extinct. In a March 2018 
interview, Rama downplayed the concerns raised by international institutions like the 
UNODC and claimed that Albania had defeated cannabis.72 This announcement followed 
numerous incidents when Rama had boasted about his government’s success in fighting 
cannabis production. For example, after the 2014 police raids in southern Albania, Rama 
posted pictures on his Facebook account showing destroyed cannabis plants as evidence 
that cannabis production was on the decline.73 The following year Rama praised the police 
following an announcement by the Albanian Interior Minister that 99.2 percent of cannabis 
grown in Albania had been destroyed. In July 2017, Rama announced that cannabis would 
be eradicated from Albania by the end of the year74—a goal that was not achieved. Instead, 
Italian authorities reported in November 2017 that aerial surveillance had found 88 
suspected cannabis plantations remaining in Albania. That figure represented a reduction 
of nearly 2,000 plantations since 2016, so Rama used the report as an opportunity to praise 
the “major progress” achieved by Italy and Albania in the quest to prevent “cannabis 
production in Albania once and for all.”75 
It is fair to argue that Rama and his government have historically exaggerated their 
achievements in eradicating Albanian cannabis, but it remains a fact that Albanian outdoor 
cannabis plantations are on the decline. The UNODC report paints a less optimistic picture 
than the Italian aerial surveillance report, but it must be noted that the annual UNODC drug 
report is a large undertaking which requires significant lead-time before the mid-year 
publishing. For that reason, statistics in the 2017 report are likely to reflect the realities of 
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previous years more than those of the current calendar year. This is evident in the 2018 
UNODC drug report. The 2018 report is the first to acknowledge Albania’s high rate of 
cannabis eradication, but it does so by referencing 2016 statistics.76 The Italian report, 
based on up-to-date surveillance, provided a more current snapshot of the situation in 
Albania in late 2017. It clearly showed that outdoor cultivation of cannabis had been 
significantly reduced, but it also showed that cannabis had not yet been eradicated 
completely from Albania. 
Cannabis is still trafficked from Albania despite the reduction of plantations. Two 
weeks after the November 2017 Italian surveillance report, Prime Minister Rama wrote a 
letter to the Financial Times stating that the remaining cannabis plantations had been 
destroyed.77 However, two months later, an Italian investigator speaking about Albanian 
cannabis was quoted as saying, “the flow of drugs from Albania across the Adriatic has not 
let up.”78 In May 2018, a newspaper article in the Sunday Times (London) stated that the 
raids on cannabis plantations had driven the production means underground.79 As an 
example, the article described a hay barn, recently discovered by police, which had been 
converted into an indoor cannabis growing facility. In the same month, police found a 
warehouse containing 671 kg of cannabis in Vlora.80 It is apparent that the criminals 
involved in the cannabis market are adapting to the destruction of outdoor plantations, and 
this has reinforced concerns that criminals receive support from corrupt police and 
government officials.  
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D. DESTABILIZING EFFECTS 
1. Political Corruption and Power Struggles 
As previously mentioned, the rise and sustainment of organized crime in Albania 
correlates with the country’s turbulent transition to democracy. What has not been 
discussed is how a constant battle for power between corrupt political parties is largely to 
blame for the difficult path to democracy that Albania has followed over the last three 
decades. The struggle for power between the DP and SP has often taken precedence over 
managing the state, resulting in exploitation and neglect of various institutions, as well as 
involvement with organized crime entities. 
Albanian democracy may have begun with fair elections, but shortly following 
them, the DP began to consolidate power. In April 1992, presidential elections were held. 
DP leader Sali Berisha, the only candidate, became the first non-communist president of 
Albania.81 Ironically, Berisha, who had led the DP to victory while expressing anti-
communist rhetoric, was a member of the Party of Labor (the name for the communist 
party) less than a year and a half before his election to president.82 According to Fred 
Abrahams, Berisha and the DP quickly resorted to a communist model of government.83 
He explains that, in order to limit presidential power, Albanian law prohibited the president 
from party membership. Berisha’s allies in parliament argued that the law only prohibited 
the president from acting as the party leader of the majority. Therefore, Berisha was able 
to remain in the DP as a member of the Steering Committee, and he turned the chairman 
position over to Eduard Selami. On the surface, it appeared that Berisha had relinquished 
control of the DP to act as head of state, but in reality, everyone knew he was still the party 
leader. Thus, Berisha commanded the majority of parliament and the presidency 
simultaneously. 
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Berisha’s talent for manipulation was not limited to his fellow Albanians. Leading 
up to the 1992 election, Berisha had requested radio equipment from the International 
Media Fund to use for campaigning.84 The International Media Fund naturally wanted to 
support the pro-democratic-free-press position of the DP, and the equipment was donated 
under an agreement that it would be used for an independent media source post-election. 
Instead, after the DP’s victory, the equipment remained in government custody and was 
used to broadcast Voice of America (VOA).85 This was a well-calculated move by Berisha. 
At the time, the United States was in full support of the new democratic Albanian 
government, and Berisha knew the VOA broadcasting would be complimentary to his 
party. 
From 1992 to 1997, the young Albanian democracy desperately needed smart fiscal 
policies—and proper enforcement of those policies—to ensure a successful shift from 
communism to capitalism. Under a new liberal market economy, the state would no longer 
provide the same level of social safety nets that were guaranteed by the old planned market 
system. Citizens would need jobs in order to be self-sufficient and to simultaneously 
stimulate the economy. The best chance of success would have come from the leaders in 
Tirana promoting strong economic institutions. Instead, corruption ran rampant throughout 
Albanian politics, and the new economy collapsed. 
Under Berisha and the DP, Albania had three main sources of income: foreign aid, 
the illegal trafficking of oil and other illicit goods, and remittances.86 Berisha’s quest to 
maintain power through authoritarian-like activities would lead to a decrease in foreign 
aid. As explained by Paolo Tripodi, shortly after assuming office Berisha turned Albania 
away from Italy—which was overwhelmingly the state’s largest contributor of foreign 
aid—in hopes of soliciting investments from the United States, Germany, and Turkey.87 
He was initially successful in persuading the United States to invest by pledging his 
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dedication to democracy. However, his use of secret police, his removal of opponents in 
the judiciary, and his party’s obvious interference with elections in 1996 led to the eventual 
withdrawal of political support from the United States and the cutting of significant 
American investments in Albania. 
The DP was also complicit in various illegal activities, most notably, the illegal 
smuggling of oil into Yugoslavia during the UN embargo from 1991 to 1996. Arsovska 
and Abrahams discuss ties between criminal smugglers, politicians, and legal businesses. 
Arsovska explains how Albanian organized crime groups in northern and southern Albania 
worked together along with criminals in Greece to move oil up to and across Albania’s 
northern border with Serbia.88 Abrahams discusses how a legitimate oil import company 
owned by the DP was importing oil at rates that far exceeded domestic demand. This 
allowed excess supply to be sold off to smugglers at a profit which could then be used for 
party funding. Abrahams also cites evidence that the opposition SP was engaged in similar 
endeavors.89 
The desire for public support caused Berisha and members of the DP to ignore the 
negative effects that remittances were having on the new market economy. Remittances 
were, and continue to be, a major factor in Albanian economics. The population of Albania 
is 2.87 million, while the population of the Albanian diaspora (Albanians and descendants 
living outside the borders of Albania) is estimated at 1.15 million. The remittances the 
diaspora provide to Albanian citizens are valued at nearly 10 percent of the Albanian gross 
domestic product (GDP).90 The movement of capital from neighboring states into Albania 
in the 1990s was initially positive for the economy, but little of the money was imported 
through official channels. 
According to an article in the magazine Finance and Development by Christopher 
Jarvis, the reason for this was that an increasing number of bad loans issued by private 
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banks in the early 1990s forced the Bank of Albania to limit credit.91 In response to the 
money shortage, remittances began to fund an informal credit market providing 
unregulated cash to Albanian citizens. Jarvis explains that with new money available to the 
public, private deposit-taking companies began to surface promising high levels of returns, 
but the companies did little investment. Instead, the deposit-taking companies relied 
primarily on new deposits to pay existing debt, thus creating pyramid schemes. Albanian 
citizens began taking out loans at increasing levels and selling off assets to invest in the 
schemes, and by 1996, it was clear that the system would not sustain itself much longer. 
However, by that point the pyramid companies had become enormously popular, and they 
were endorsed heavily by the DP, which was receiving campaign contributions from some 
companies. When the Bank of Albania attempted to regulate the system in 1996, Berisha 
and members of the DP provided no support. The SP was also unwilling to intervene, partly 
due to its involvement with the schemes and largely due to the political backlash such an 
intervention would incite. In November 1996, the first pyramid companies began to default, 
and by 1997, the entire Albanian economy collapsed. 
Ironically, Albania was saved by Italy—the very country that Berisha had been 
attempting to reduce its dependence on. Initial reactions from NATO and EU countries to 
the sudden economic collapse of Albania were of surprise, followed by disagreement on 
what action to take. Initially, a proposal for an EU-sponsored military stabilization 
operation was rejected.92 Proposals for UN and NATO intervention also received little 
support.93 With no consensus on a solution to the problem, Rome decided to intervene with 
the support of any other interested states. With UN blessing in the form of United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1101, Italy led a Multinational Protection Force 
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(MPF) into Albania on a peacekeeping mission named Operation Alba.94 The operation 
allowed for an interim government to function while new elections were held. 
Rome continued to make substantial commitments toward keeping Albania intact. 
Italy began by pledging L210 billion to establish a three-year plan (1997-1999) with new 
political institutions in Albania.95 Additionally, Italy set the stage for Albania’s EU 
candidacy that would come later in the 21st century. This was done by convening multiple 
meetings with Albania and other European countries in 1997 to establish a roadmap for 
Tirana to follow; the aims were political normalization, economic reform, and internal 
security.96 
Albania had joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 by its own 
accord,97 but it was Italy that would ensure that Albania attained membership in the 
alliance. As Operation Alba completed its mission in August 1997 and the coalition troops 
redeployed home, the Italians maintained some of their forces in Albania. Italy’s goal was 
to ensure that the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) developed to Western standards, which, 
given the conditions of the Albanian state at the time, was not a simple task. Rome 
nonetheless created the Italian Delegation of Experts (IDE) and undertook the 16-year 
activity (from 1997 to 2013) of training the AAF to achieve and then maintain NATO 
standards.98  
Despite its large investment in Albania, Rome could not control the corrupt 
politicians who used the 1997 disaster as an opportunity to shift the governmental balance 
of power in their favor. Berisha’s defiant attempts to remain in power in 1997 were 
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responsible for escalating violence throughout the state, but the members of the SP did not 
go out of their way to try to calm the violent anti-DP groups that had surfaced. In fact, the 
SP was actually linked to some violent anti-DP offenders, including gang leader Zani 
Myrteza Çaushi. According to Arsovska, Çaushi led multiple armed Albanians in an 
uprising against the government in March 1997 and was a supporter of the armed non-state 
group, the Salvation Committee of Vlore, which backed the SP.99 Çaushi also acted as a 
bodyguard for an SP politician during the June 1997 elections. After the SP gained power 
in the elections, Çaushi was indicted for multiple crimes in 1997 and 1998 but served no 
jail time. It was not until 1999, following a violent shootout, that Çaushi was eventually 
sentenced to jail after the media began to report on his possible ties to the SP and its prime 
minister, Fatos Nano. This is just one of many examples Arsovska cites linking criminal 
entities and SP members, and it explains why trust in the new SP government showed little 
improvement over the recently deposed DP. Reinforcing this point is a 1998 World Bank 
report that found the Albanian public was well aware of corruption among public officials 
and stated, “[in Albania] corruption is deeply institutionalized.”100 
The SP had promised Albanians a new and honest government during the elections 
of 1997, but little changed beyond the name of the governing party. Citizens were still 
furious over the pyramid schemes which had stolen their savings. In order to quell public 
outrage toward the government, a commission was formed to investigate the pyramid 
schemes. The purpose was to demonstrate transparency and hold the politicians who had 
aided the schemes accountable, but it became clear that politicians on both the right and 
the left were accomplices in the catastrophe.101 
The SP enjoyed control over state-run media, allowing it to keep reports of its 
involvement in the pyramid schemes off television, but it held no monopoly over print 
media. Therefore, the SP turned to alternative means to minimize the voice of its critics. A 
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2002 Human Rights Watch report on Albania explained in depth how the government 
stifled the free press through intimidation, defamation trials, and the misuse of state 
advertising.102 Intimidation was a tool used by government officials and corrupt police 
officers or criminals who did not want journalists reporting on their activities. Defamation 
trials were brought against journalists and media institutions that were critical of the 
government, and the misuse of state advertising funds allowed the government to punish 
its media critics financially. According to the report, 
state advertising is critical to the financial survival of many Albanian 
dailies, … financial leverage over the press can be easily abused by the 
government, … [and] mechanisms that can effectively ensure the fair and 
non-discriminatory allocation of state advertising…do not exist or are 
inadequate in Albania.103 
As Albania entered the 21st century, political competition escalated to new heights. 
News articles and reports describe the usual bitter power struggles that took place between 
the SP and the DP, but they also describe infighting that occurred within the SP up until 
2003.104 Much of the division that took place within the SP was due to various party 
members attempting to distance themselves from the corruption and criminal allegations 
that had engulfed so much of the government. Nano accused fellow party members of 
corruption and criminal connections while conveniently disregarding his own questionable 
past. Nano’s actions were successful at restoring him to power within the party, but he, like 
the rest of his party, had lost the trust of the Albanian citizens. The DP took advantage of 
the public loss of confidence in the SP. Leading up to the 2005 elections, the DP newspaper 
Rilindja Demokratike referred to members of the SP as communists,105 and accused SP 
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candidates of corruption and criminal activity, stating, for example, that “Nano’s black 
candidates smell of smuggled cigarettes…and, certainly, of drugs.”106 
Frustration with the SP was so strong among the Albanian public that the citizens 
were willing to let Berisha, and the party which had destroyed the entire economy just eight 
years earlier, back into power. The July 2005 election resulted in the DP winning a majority 
of seats in parliament with fifty-six to the SP’s forty-two.107 Considering the devastation 
the country experienced under Berisha and the DP during the 1990s, it is safe to assume 
that the 2005 elections were generally a vote by Albanians against the SP rather than a vote 
for the DP. 
Little improved in Albanian politics over the next decade. Berisha was quick to re-
establish his old ways despite his anti-corruption campaign promises of coming into office 
“with clean hands.”108 Thus, history repeated itself in 2013 when frustrated Albanians 
chose again to vote against the majority party rather than for the opposition. 
Contrary to years past, the elections of 2013, which placed the SP back into the 
majority, appeared to have been relatively fair. Both the OSCE and the EU gave their 
blessing to the results in a way that implied that the elections were still not up to Western 
standards, but they were more than acceptable for Albania, considering its past 
elections.109 The SP party head, Edi Rama, became Albania’s new Prime Minister. Three 
days after the elections, Berisha made an uncharacteristic statement by congratulating his 
opponent and resigning from his party’s functions.110 Albania seemed to have made 
significant progress in the quest for a functioning democracy. 
Rama, like many Albanian politicians before him, campaigned against 
governmental corruption, but eliminating corruption was an enormous challenge in 2013. 
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The economy was slow, unemployment was high, and Albania was fourth on Transparency 
International’s ranking of the most corrupt countries in Europe.111 Furthermore, Rama had 
allied himself with former Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta to help defeat the DP. Meta 
had a reputation for corruption. His reputation was justified in the minds of many Albanians 
when he resigned as Prime Minister in 2011 after an Albanian television station broadcast 
video of him attempting to influence the decision of a government power plant contract.112 
Nevertheless, under Rama, the EU granted Albania candidate status in 2014 after 
determining that Albania had finally fulfilled a stabilization and association agreement 
(SAA) that had been in place since 2009.113  
Albania has moved in positive directions since the 2013 elections, but the wild 
exaggerations and harsh political accusations along partisan lines still routinely surface in 
the media today, and they show little sign of diminishing. In May 2018, DP opposition 
parties scheduled a rally to protest against Rama, claiming that government corruption 
under him is threatening the country’s prospects for EU membership. In a statement to the 
Associated Press, the head of the DP, Lulzim Basha, claimed that “hundreds of thousands” 
of citizens attended the rally to speak out against the government’s ties to organized 
crime114 (a claim which is extremely unlikely to be well-founded when one takes into 
account the fact that the population of Tirana is less than 500,000).115 The party 
newspapers continue their biased reporting, and there are also unaffiliated partisan 
newspapers which further saturate the public with non-objective information. In early 
August 2018, the right leaning Gazeta 55 published commentary claiming that Rama has 
criminal ties, uses cannabis, and rose to power thanks to support from George Soros.116  
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The continuance of partisan battles hinders Albania’s potential to overcome 
corruption and crime. Albania receives poor rankings by external institutions with respect 
to corruption, but more damaging are the internal perceptions of corruption. A 2016 report 
by Transparency International found a lack of confidence among Albanian citizens in their 
politicians and governmental institutions, including the judicial system, and it cited high 
levels of “civic apathy.”117 In other words, Albanians see the government as a broken 
institution with little possibility of repair. Worse yet, their apathy extends beyond their 
feelings toward the state to their feelings about society as a whole. There is little desire to 
work for a greater good. Therefore, the citizens are concerned with themselves and those 
closest to them, but invest little in the larger community. This attitude makes it easy for 
people to justify evading and avoiding taxes, dealing in unregulated economic markets, 
and engaging in criminal behavior. In this environment, it is no surprise that cannabis 
became such a large part of Albania’s gray economy.  
2. Gray Economy 
Economically, the cannabis market adds to what Arsovska refers to as a “gray 
economy.”118 For the most part, Arsovska’s use of this term describes an economy built 
on illicit goods and services. The illicit aspect of a gray economy means that it operates 
outside the regulation of a state, but this does not mean that it is necessarily unregulated. 
A gray economy may be loosely regulated by social structures, including shared norms and 
values, or directly regulated by criminal organizations. Arsovska maintains that gray 
economies can actually benefit citizens in poor countries by providing a form of income in 
areas where little opportunity exists, but her view overlooks the inevitable pitfalls of such 
an economy on both a microeconomic and macroeconomic scale. Gray economies create a 
cycle in which crime and corruption cause slow economic growth, which further 
encourages crime and corruption. In the event the state pursues an end to the gray economy, 
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it is the poor citizens that are most likely to suffer. Both shortcomings of a gray economy 
have been demonstrated in the case of southern Albania. 
Until 2014, much of the cannabis cultivation in Albania took place in the south in 
underdeveloped villages like Lazarat. These villages had little governance and access to 
public services, and this explains why local residents began to rely on a product that was 
easy to produce and profitable. The cannabis market established a gray economy that 
provided residents with crops to grow and receive money for. Cannabis obviously must be 
sold to make money. For the cannabis production to be profitable, it must be distributed in 
large quantities. Consequently, those producing the cannabis had to engage with organized 
criminal groups capable of smuggling the product in bulk, and by the late 1990s, criminal 
organizations had taken over the market.119 
The outdoor cultivation and trafficking of cannabis from Lazarat would not have 
flourished without the assistance of corrupt officials. It is not a coincidence that Lazarat 
was the primary location of outdoor cannabis cultivation until 2014. The town citizens were 
faithful supporters of the DP during their time in power from 2005 to 2013.120 
Unfortunately for the poor residents of Lazarat, the gray economy may have provided 
income, but they likely received fewer benefits than their criminal counterparts and corrupt 
officials. One reason for this is that corruption has its greatest negative impact on the poor. 
According to the World Bank, 
Corruption has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable, 
increasing costs and reducing access to services, including health, education 
and justice…Empirical studies have shown that the poor pay the highest 
percentage of their income in bribes.121 
Therefore, it is fair to assume the individuals that profited most from the cannabis trade in 
Lazarat were the professional criminals and corrupt politicians. 
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Another reason the gray economy was not of great benefit to the residents of 
Lazarat is that they ultimately suffered legally and economically after Rama and the SP 
took power in 2013. Tirana was under international pressure over its flourishing cannabis 
market so the state reacted with force against Lazarat. The raids in Lazarat in 2014 were 
championed by Rama and Albanian officials as a great success, but in reality, they simply 
forced the criminal traffickers to move their operations elsewhere. A 2016 Balkan Insight 
article by Elvis Nabolli addressed how criminals adapted to the raids by spreading cannabis 
plantations throughout the country.122 Additionally, Nabolli points out that officials had 
made only low-level arrests from 2014 to 2016. The failure to contain the cannabis market 
and bring down high-level criminals led to the firing of the national police chief in early 
2018.123 Drug traffickers were able to shift their trade to other areas to avoid legal 
punishment and continue to earn profits. However, the residents of Lazarat were forced to 
either continue cultivating cannabis under a heightened risk of arrest, or try to make ends 
meet through less profitable means.  
The gray economy created by the Albanian cannabis market has had negative 
macroeconomic impacts on the country as well. One issue is that the income generated is 
unregulated by the state, so the state institutions receive no revenue. This is a problem in 
Albania where 18 percent of the GDP comes from the agriculture sector.124 With an 
enormous amount of land being used to cultivate cannabis, rather than legal taxable crops, 
the state government is deprived of significant funds. 
This may not appear to be a problem to the average Albanian citizen—who is not 
always enthusiastic about contributing taxes to the state. However, the development of 
Albania as a whole is hindered when large sums of money are withheld from official 
channels. One example of this can be seen in an analysis of the remittances that make up a 
significant income source for Albanian citizens. In a 2018 report by the Bank of Albania, 
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the authors explain the drawbacks of keeping money out of the banking system.125 At the 
individual level, moving cash through informal channels comes with higher transaction 
costs, and individuals forego opportunities to invest or earn interest on their money. 
Therefore, the individuals are left with less money in both the short-term and long-term. 
At the societal level, less money in the banking system equates to less supply, which 
increases the cost of money in the form of higher interest rates. High interest rates slow the 
economy by acting as a barrier for individuals and businesses looking to purchase homes, 
buildings, or other assets. Although remittances are perfectly legal, the insistence of many 
Albanian citizens to deal in cash rather than through the banking system directly hinders 
potential economic growth that remittances could stimulate. This choice may be somewhat 
based on a preference for cash, but it is primarily based on a lack of trust. A survey 
conducted by the Bank of Albania found that over half of the respondents do not have a 
bank account.126 If trust in Albanian financial institutions was stronger, more Albanians 
would establish and maintain bank accounts.  
Another example of how Albanian economic development is stunted by the gray 
economy is demonstrated by the cycle of corruption produced from illegal funds being 
invested in the legal economy. Money acquired through illegal activity, like the cannabis 
trade, will catch the attention of authorities if it is simply deposited in a bank. To avoid 
this, the proceeds generated by the cannabis market are often laundered into real estate or 
businesses like the construction industry.127 These reinvestments require illegal market 
practices to merge with legal practices, and this merger can only be accomplished through 
corruption. Albanian citizens witness this corruption, further eroding their trust in state 
institutions. This leads to their reluctance to invest their legally earned money in banks or 
other financial institutions. With little investment in the economy, economic growth is 
stunted; and citizens turn to the gray market for income, furthering the cycle of corruption. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The rise of Albanian organized crime coincided with a difficult transition from 
communism to a democracy. While much of the country was figuring out a way forward 
and adapting old laws to a new societal structure, criminal activity went mostly ignored. 
Cannabis was allowed to spread rapidly through ungoverned areas in southern Albania, 
and soon its product was being trafficked throughout Europe. As Europe began to react 
negatively to the development, political rivalries in Albania focused primarily on their 
power struggles seeking control of the government by any means possible. Cooperating 
with criminal organizations became a normal activity if it helped one’s party attain seats in 
parliament. As international pressure increased further, Prime Minister Edi Rama began to 
take forceful measures to combat the cannabis market. Tirana’s efforts became highlights 
for the new government to show EU governments and institutions its commitment to 
fighting crime and corruption, but Albanian citizens view these efforts with a critical eye. 
For multiple decades, Albanian citizens have had to deal with corrupt state institutions and 
informal criminal economies. Tirana has made significant progress against the cannabis 
market, but the destabilizing effects it has produced will likely linger for many years to 
come.  
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III. ALBANIAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
This chapter argues that the Albanian transnational illicit cannabis market damages 
Albania’s global reputation, impedes Albania’s quest for EU membership, and causes 
concern for NATO allies. It begins by providing an overview of the concerns voiced across 
the globe about the threat posed by transnational organized crime in general. Next, this 
chapter discusses the complicated problem that cannabis creates for policy makers because 
of the global confusion generated by the cannabis debate by reviewing challenges that have 
occurred with decriminalization in the United States. The next two sections look at how 
damage to Albania’s global reputation has hurt Albanian citizens and diaspora, degraded 
policy and law enforcement efforts, and hampered Albania’s quest for EU membership. 
Lastly, the chapter briefly covers regional security concerns for NATO with respect to the 
cannabis market. 
A. CANNABIS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Global Concerns about TOC 
Unlike the debated definition of TOC, the belief that TOC is a global threat 
produces little contest. The reaction is not a surprise considering that estimates for various 
transnational crimes often express the enormity of the problem. 2010 estimates for 
trafficking in persons show that 70,000 victims are trafficked annually for a value of $3 
billion; and counterfeiting of products results in the production of 2 billion articles per year 
worth $8.2 billion.128 These are just two examples of numerous crimes associated with 
TOC which have caught the attention of lawmakers, international institutions, and world 
leaders. However, the seriousness of the threat is often different throughout the world. 
TOC takes on unique forms in various locations affecting countries in different 
ways. In the case of human smuggling, the United States primarily struggles against the 
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smuggling of migrants into its territory from Mexico and South America.129 European 
countries deal with a slightly more complex problem in having to combat the smuggling 
of migrants from Africa and the Middle East. With respect to human trafficking, Eastern 
European women have been heavily targeted by traffickers in the sex trade compared to 
those in Central or Western Europe. 2005 to 2006 data show that 32 percent of human 
trafficking victims detected in Europe came from the Balkans and 19 percent were from 
former Soviet Union countries, yet only 7 percent came from Central Europe, and no 
significant percentage was given for Western Europe.130 
In its multiple forms, TOC has the ability to threaten a state’s stability, global 
security, or both. Stephen Ellis provides a good example of how TOC threatens state 
stability in his book chapter, “Nigerian Organized Crime.” Ellis describes Nigeria as a 
kleptocracy and notes that it has been a source of many transnational crimes, including 
drug trafficking, international fraud, and illegal oil trafficking.131 Ellis argues that the 
coordination of these transnational crimes often traces back to state officials. This implies 
that TOC is intertwined with the normal functions of the state, which hinders its 
effectiveness and stability. 
TOC can also threaten global stability when it provides support to violent extremist 
organizations (VEO). According to the UNODC, “it is well established that there are 
terrorists and non-State armed groups profiting from the drug trade.”132 In this case, 
terrorists are using revenue from drug trafficking to fund operations and purchase weapons. 
Weapons are available because of the transnational crime of trafficking firearms. While 
there is little indication that Albanian TOC is funding terrorism—a point that will be 
covered thoroughly in the final chapter of this thesis—that does not stop countries from 
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having concerns about terrorism whenever large-scale drug trafficking operations are 
discovered. 
Of the numerous types of transnational crimes, drug trafficking is considered to be 
one of the largest markets. In 2005, the UNODC reported the illicit drug market was 
estimated to be worth $322 billion globally.133 In 2012, the UNODC estimated that drug 
trafficking amounted to almost half of all TOC profits,134 but their estimate fell to 
“between one fifth to one third” by 2014.135 In the same year Peter Reuter wrote that “the 
markets for illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, heroin, and cannabis, probably generate, 
globally, more revenues than any other illegal market,”136 although he admitted the data 
available are not sufficient to conclusively prove this claim. Most recently, the UNODC 
has taken the stance that among TOCs, drug trafficking profits are second only to 
counterfeiting goods.137 It must be recalled that criminals seek to avoid detection, making 
their activities difficult to measure. Therefore, estimates of the size of any illicit market 
must be viewed with some skepticism. That being said, the large annual amount of drug 
shipment seizures, drug-related hospitalizations, and drug-related deaths provide evidence 
that the size of the global drug market is by no means trivial. 
2. Global Debate about Cannabis 
Cannabis is a difficult problem for policy makers around the globe. It naturally 
attracts the attention of policy makers and global citizens because it is estimated to be the 
most widely consumed illicit drug on the globe. It is true that estimates will naturally have 
inaccuracies, but given that the estimate cited by the UNODC for cannabis use is five and 
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a half times that of the next closest competing drug,138 the estimate of cannabis use is not 
something that can be ignored. While it is an unavoidable truth that cannabis use is prolific 
throughout the globe, the level of use is not troubling for those who believe cannabis is a 
harmless drug.  
The level of actual physical harm that cannabis causes is heavily debated. Unlike 
heroin or cocaine, cannabis is not typically associated with serious addiction and death. 
The perceived harmlessness of the drug sometimes leads to inconsistent enforcement. The 
UNODC observed that “The global community is confused about cannabis” because 
international laws against the drug are firm but enforcement is typically much more lenient 
than that affecting other illicit drugs.139 
The difficulty in determining the harmfulness of cannabis lies in its history as an 
illegal drug, emotional public reactions to decriminalization, and the development of new 
and more potent cannabis strains. The United States can provide insight to how each of 
these factors can complicate the determination.  
Cannabis has been illegal in the United States for decades, complicating research 
into its effects. The U.S. federal government has five schedules that classify controlled 
substances which trace their roots back to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970.140 
These schedules determine the severity of the substances and are currently laid out in the 
United States Code, Title 21, Chapter 13, Subchapter 1, which is still referenced as the 
CSA.141 The CSA lists “marihuana” and “Tetrahydrocannabinols” (THC) as schedule 1 
substances, which indicates: 
(A) the drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse, (B) the drug 
or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
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United States, (C) there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or 
other substance under medical supervision.142 
This classification of the cannabis plant and its active chemical THC have made it 
historically difficult to study. This is beginning to change now that over half of the states 
within the United States have legalized cannabis for medical use with some now allowing 
both medical and recreational use.143 Although cannabis is not legal at the federal level, 
research studies have proceeded—albeit with some bureaucratic red tape. This scenario has 
played out in a similar manner globally as the UN laws on cannabis are similar to those of 
the U.S. federal government. 
Some experts hold that public reaction to the decriminalization of cannabis has been 
emotional rather than rational, which has also added to the difficulty in determining the 
harmfulness of the drug. According to a Time article, starting around 1973, multiple U.S. 
states began to decriminalize cannabis owing to a belief that the drug was not harmful.144 
Although there was not significant scientific research into the effects of cannabis, the move 
toward decriminalization was initially well received. Along with decriminalization came 
stores selling cannabis paraphernalia, advertisements toward youth, and speculative reports 
that childhood use of the drug was rising. By the 1980s, vigorous parental backlash against 
these unforeseen consequences of decriminalization began to force a rollback of the 1970s 
legalization movement before any serious studies on cannabis could be done. 
Similar movements are present in U.S. states that have legalized cannabis in recent, 
years, adding confusion to public knowledge about cannabis. In Colorado, for example, 
which permits medical and recreational use of cannabis, advocacy groups such as Smart 
Colorado have been fighting the legalization since 2012 on the grounds that it endangers 
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youth.145 Meanwhile, pro-cannabis groups continue to argue that cannabis use poses few 
or no health risks. Like the movements of the late 1970s, arguments in this fight have often 
been emotional ones based on pre-determined beliefs, and they have relied on non-peer 
reviewed studies and questionable citing of those studies to support their arguments. This 
is part of the reason why, until recently, there have been few, if any, truly comprehensive 
and objective studies on the effects of cannabis for both short-term and long-term health 
risks. 
In fact, a recent book published by the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine in 2017 may be the first of its type. It covers a wide range of 
health topics and reviews the evidence of how cannabis may or may not affect them. The 
book was the product of a nationwide sixteen-member committee of professionals, with a 
support staff of eleven professional study staff members and six consultants from various 
scientific and medical backgrounds.146 Furthermore, it was reviewed nationally by fifteen 
professionals from institutions such as the Yale School of Medicine, Johns Hopkins 
University, and the UCLA School of Medicine to ensure its objectivity. It appears that both 
the pro and anti-cannabis advocacy groups have reacted to the report emotionally, quickly 
citing the results within the report that support their agenda, while disregarding the results 
that may hinder their narrative. This is telling, in that long-standing individual beliefs about 
the safety or danger of cannabis are emotionally based and difficult to change even with 
scientific data. This is true throughout the globe and not merely unique to the United States. 
To further complicate determining the harmfulness of cannabis, forms of the drug 
and even its genetic composition have changed substantially. According to the National 
Academies of Sciences, in the United States alone, cannabis-derived products come in 
various forms which are either smoked, ingested, vaporized, or absorbed through the skin 
via creams and patches.147 Consuming cannabis products in each of the various ways can 
produce different effects, and the potency of THC among the different forms of cannabis 
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varies as well. For researchers attempting to provide policy makers with objective facts on 
the potential health risks this becomes problematic. In the case of chewable foods that 
contain cannabis, a directed study may show that adults can safely consume the food in 
certain quantities without any significant health risk. However, this does not satisfy 
concerns over how the chewable food may affect children if accidentally ingested, nor does 
it provide any insight to how likely accidental child ingestion may be because of the 
existence of such food. 
The various potency of cannabis products adds yet another complication to 
understanding the health risks of cannabis. From 2010 to 2016, cannabis cultivation was 
reported by 145 countries.148 Not only does cannabis grow in numerous outdoor global 
climates, it can also be produced indoors in grow houses. The astonishing number of places 
around the globe which cultivate cannabis have, as with any agricultural crop, inevitably 
led to producers learning ways to increase yields and quality through genetic modification. 
In the case of cannabis quality, higher potency (i.e., its THC content) is synonymous with 
higher quality. This means that dried cannabis flowers, commonly referred to as “buds,” 
from one source may have a significantly higher THC content than those from another 
source, making scientific study difficult. Some growers have developed techniques to grow 
plants from clones rather than from seeds; and this has increased the average potency of 
cannabis in the United States from 4 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2014.149 As a result, 
studies of the health effects of cannabis can quickly become outdated as the forms of 
cannabis and its potencies evolve throughout the globe. 
The history of cannabis legality, the emotion surrounding the debate on 
decriminalization, and the constant evolution of the forms and potencies of cannabis have 
fragmented the United States in a way few other topics can rival. As mentioned previously 
just over half of U.S. states now permit the medical use of cannabis, with about one in five 
allowing recreational use. This has occurred despite the substance being illegal and unsafe 
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per U.S. federal law. In an odd twist, the District of Columbia, which is home to all three 
branches of the U.S. federal government, has legalized cannabis for both medical and 
recreational use.150 While the cannabis question in the United States may look like a fiasco 
to onlookers, the situation is by no means unique to the United States. The same issues are 
globally applicable and for these reasons both the EU and NATO cannot simply ignore the 
cannabis market in Albania.  
3. Global Effects of Albanian Cannabis Trafficking 
A major consequence of the Albanian cannabis market is its ability to damage 
Albanians’ and the state’s global reputation. This can lead to negative consequences for 
ethnic Albanians living abroad, and can also lead to ineffective policy and law enforcement 
efforts in cannabis consuming-countries.  
The cannabis market damages Albania’s global reputation in numerous ways. 
Although this is not an exhaustive list, cannabis damages Albania’s global reputation in 
three major ways: through corruption, a reputation of lawlessness, and transnational 
organized crime. 
Corruption damages Albania’s global reputation because it degrades the credibility 
of officials in Albania and raises questions as to their dedication to combatting the problem. 
For example, it would be difficult for state officials in Berlin to trust that officials in Tirana 
are serious about combatting cannabis if they suspect that those same officials in Tirana 
are aiding in or profiting from the trafficking of cannabis. As a consequence, Berlin 
officials may be reluctant or unwilling to work with counterparts in Tirana, which 
undermines the benefits that are attainable through joint intervention. In response, the lack 
of trust can insult those in Tirana who are truly committed to the effort—further degrading 
cooperation. 
This erosion of trust at the state official level can also be assumed at the law 
enforcement level, but at this level, cooperation is arguably more important. While distrust 
at the political level may result in poorly established policy, policy itself, whether good or 
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bad, matters little if it is not effectively enforced. If intelligence gathering and operations 
against cannabis trafficking are compromised by corrupt authorities, there exists little 
chance of success in stopping the problem. 
The cannabis market damages ethnic Albanians’ reputations because it creates a 
perception of lawlessness and violence within the Albanian state that gets projected on all 
Albanians. As far back as 1993, news reports began to surface about increasing levels of 
cannabis cultivation within Albania.151 By the late 1990s, reports became more sensational 
with journalists referencing violent criminal organizations that were flourishing in southern 
Albania in reaction to the “cannabis boom.”152 Articles in January 2018 referred to Albania 
as “Cannabistan”153 and reinforced the global belief that Albania is an unruly land rife 
with crime and violence. 
This perception of Albanian lawlessness and violence creates two second-order 
effects that tend to reinforce one another. The first effect is that, over time, the line between 
fact and fiction becomes blurred. For example, Albania was extremely violent following 
the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997. According to the figures provided by 
Arsovska, in 1997 alone over 1,500 people were murdered out of a population of around 3 
million.154 To put that in perspective, that equates to a rate of around 50 people for every 
100,000 in the population. However, the murder rate was cut by over half within one year 
and was down to under 3 people for every 100,000 by 2008.155 While it is fair to argue 
that there is significant criminal activity in Albania, it would be incorrect to categorize 
contemporary Albania as a particularly violent country. However, many reports on Albania 
make little effort to separate crime and violence, which effectively blurs the truth. 
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The second effect is that Albania’s perceived lawlessness and violence can foster a 
sense of xenophobia toward ethnic Albanians living abroad. Albania is a very homogenous 
society, which can lead people to incorrectly assume that the commonly reported-on 
activity of a small portion of citizens within Albania is likely synonymous with the activity 
of ethnic Albanians as a whole. This is particularly significant because, as cited in Chapter 
II, over 1 million ethnic Albanians—about one quarter of all ethnic Albanians—live 
outside the borders of Albania. These irrational fears can be reinforced by myths and partial 
truths, while myths and partial truths can be a reinforced by irrational fears. As the second 
order effects of xenophobia and blurred truths build on one another, Albania minority 
populations living abroad can become victims of unjust stereotypes and other prejudices.  
The TOC that is created by the cannabis market damages the state’s global 
reputation because it makes Albanian institutions appear lacking in capability. Foreign 
states view the cannabis market as a problem that should be contained within the borders 
of Albania because it is cultivated in this country. Therefore, onlookers see the Albanian 
authorities as ultimately responsible for stopping the TOC related to cannabis. For 
institutions like the EU, the continued existence of TOC is evidence of a breakdown in 
cooperation between Albanian police officers and judicial prosecutors.156 The United 
States Ambassador to Albania, Donald Lu, was more critical in his assessment last year, 
declaring that, “if America and EU countries are going to devote our resources and our 
credibility to this war against organized crime, we expect results.”157 
Corruption, a perception of lawlessness, and transnational organized crime can 
work together in a complicated fashion to negatively influence policy and enforcement 
efforts in countries abroad. For example, in May 2018, accusations surfaced that Albanian 
criminals were taking over the United Kingdom’s (UK) cocaine market, and Prime 
Minister Rama was criticized during a BBC interview regarding Albania’s lack of control 
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over the situation.158 This specific criticism was in reference to cocaine rather than 
cannabis, but the roots of the criticism lie in Albania’s damaged reputation. Implying that 
ethnic Albanian criminals in the UK are linked to criminals in Albania is largely based on 
a stereotype likely encouraged by xenophobic views of Albanians. It implies that Albanian 
criminals only work with Albanians. This is obviously a false assumption, but even if it 
were true, it overlooks the enormity of the Albania diaspora population which could 
participate in trafficking, as opposed to individuals within Albania. It also implies that 
corruption within the Albanian government, or a lack of capabilities in Albanian law 
enforcement, or both, should be blamed for the criminal activity taking place within the 
UK. This is a misguided criticism. Criminal activity by ethnic Albanians within the borders 
of the UK is not the responsibility of Albania, just as an ethnic Japanese person committing 
a crime in the United States is not the responsibility of Japan. While it would be reasonable 
for UK officials to encourage Tirana to combat the trafficking of cocaine from its territory, 
it would be foolish to expect that criminal activity within the UK should be handled by 
Albania simply because the criminals are ethnically Albanian. Such views are highly 
counterproductive because they waste resources assigning blame rather than defining 
solutions, ultimately compromising policy and enforcement efforts.  
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ALBANIA 
The Albanian cannabis market presents the EU with multiple problems. First, it is 
difficult to combat because the product’s perceived harmlessness to individuals can 
overshadow the negative impacts it can have with respect to criminal trafficking and 
corruption. Second, while it would be ideal if the market was eliminated before Albania 
joins the EU, its swift removal could have damaging consequences for Albania’s growing, 
yet vulnerable economy. Lastly, delays in membership due to concerns about the cannabis 
market could lead Albania to seek economic support from EU competitors or strain 
relations between EU member states and Tirana.  
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The Albanian cannabis market is likely concerning for the EU because the 
confusion about cannabis makes it uniquely suitable for transnational crime. In the case of 
a “hard” drug like heroin, punishments are severe for traffickers, dealers, and even 
consumers in most countries. Additionally, the punishments are consistently enforced in 
states with a strong rule of law. In the case of cannabis, punishments typically decrease as 
the product gets closer to the consumer. Some countries have decriminalized possession 
and recreational use of cannabis altogether. Decreasing punishment equates to decreasing 
risk as the product gets closer to the consumer, making the product attractive for criminals. 
Furthermore, the commonly perceived harmlessness of the product means that authorities 
may be more likely to accept bribes, or possibly just charge less for bribes, as the product 
moves across borders. This provides another incentive for traffickers to pick the cannabis 
market rather than the “hard” drug market, where willing accomplices are fewer and/or 
more expensive. 
As a candidate for EU membership, Albania’s efforts to reduce organized crime 
constitute a focal point that is examined annually by the European Commission.159 Among 
these examinations are reviews of the efforts put forward by the Albanian government to 
combat its cannabis market. The EU’s concern is warranted. Most government and law 
enforcement agencies agree that unregulated proceeds from illicit markets can have serious 
consequences. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) warns that “the vast sums 
of money involved [with TOC] can compromise legitimate economies and have a direct 
impact on governments through the corruption of public officials.”160 EU members 
recognize that membership for Albania will only make the trafficking of cannabis easier. 
Therefore, the EU’s desire to see Albania contain the cannabis market prior to attaining 
membership is reasonable. 
That being said, the EU must also consider economic impacts should Albanian 
membership be further delayed. As noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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mission in March 2018, the Albanian economy is one of the fastest growing in the region, 
but its rate of growth is predicted to slow as infrastructure projects funded by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) conclude.161 Albania is ranked as a high-middle income country by the 
World Bank, but it sits just above the cutoff for low-middle income.162 So much so, that 
as little as a $424 decrease in GNI per capita would drop Albania to low-middle income by 
World Bank standards.163 FDI has helped the economy, but it has been focused on industry 
and resource extraction, which does not necessarily benefit the large part of the Albanian 
workforce (over 40 percent) that is in agriculture.164 Additionally, public debt sits at over 
70 percent and non-performing loans (NPL) made up 13.2 percent of loans in 2017.165 In 
short, the economy is delicate at the moment, and the impacts the cannabis market has on 
the stability of the economy need to be factored into Albania’s future.  
With the current vulnerabilities in the Albanian economy, the elimination of the 
cannabis market could lead to problems without processes put in place to offer alternative 
opportunities for those who rely on it to sustain themselves. Law enforcement institutions 
are concerned with the criminal element and governmental corruption associated with 
cannabis, but, as mentioned in chapter II, there is a significant gray economy that exists 
because of the market, and there are Albanians who rely on that economy for their 
livelihoods who are not necessarily hardened criminals. This leaves the member states of 
the EU with a tough decision. Will they accept Albania in the EU with its ongoing fight 
against the cannabis market or continue to delay until Albania proves it has fully dealt with 
it? 
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If they choose the former option, there is a risk that Tirana may take pressure off 
its fight against cannabis once it attains membership, or alternatively look to the EU to help 
manage the cannabis market, costing the EU resources. In either scenario, the EU would 
add a member with a highly undesirable crime and corruption problem.  
If the EU chooses the latter option, there is a risk that public support for EU 
membership within Albania may begin to recede. Albania applied for EU membership in 
2009 and has been a candidate since 2014.166 In 2015, Albanian citizens still 
overwhelmingly supported EU membership, but these citizens have a long history of 
receiving unkept promises by politicians. With membership talks now delayed by another 
year until mid-2019,167 patience may begin to wear thin for Albanians. The danger of 
waning public support is that it may force Albanian officials to expedite efforts to destroy 
the cannabis market in hopes of avoiding further membership delays. This rush would 
likely come at the expense of firmly establishing an economic backup plan for those who 
will be most affected by the termination of the cannabis gray economy. 
Another danger of waning public support is that it could lead to Tirana looking for 
supporting states outside the EU. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron referred to 
the speculation that Russia or Turkey might attempt to spread its influence in Albania 
should EU membership not be granted soon. He noted the difficult decision the EU faces 
because admitting Albania too soon may have stability risks for the EU, but delay may lead 
Tirana to seek assistance from EU competitors.168 
Albanian Prime Minister Rama knows that Albania’s reputation as a major 
producer of European cannabis is damaging to Albania’s quest for EU accession. In order 
to overcome this obstacle Rama has also been vocal about the strides his country has made 
in eliminating cannabis from its territory. As mentioned in chapter II, Rama has posted 
pictures on his Facebook page with comments about how successful the police raids on 
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cannabis plantations had been compared to years past. Moreover, he announced that 
cannabis would be eradicated from Albania by the end of 2017, and he commended Italy’s 
report supporting Albania’s claims of success against the illicit cannabis market. 
Rama’s strong desire to demonstrate the strides Albania has made against cannabis 
may actually be doing the country more harm than good. Many of Tirana’s successes have 
been overshadowed by aforementioned reports and news articles indicating that cannabis 
is still originating from Albania. The perceptions that have been created by Tirana’s 
continuous lofty claims of success followed by journalist reports to the contrary include 
lack of capacity, lack of will, or—possibly—lack of honesty. These perceptions have 
caused concern among some EU member states, notably the Dutch, who have become 
critics of Rama. In May 2018, Tirana received an official visit by Dutch MPs who, after 
reviewing the government’s reform progress, concluded that Albania had yet to 
demonstrate the will to fight crime and corruption at high levels.169 Rama and the SP were 
noticeably upset by the setback. Rama responded with harsh words toward the Dutch 
visitors, and the speaker for the Albanian Parliament, Gramoz Ruçi, retaliated against the 
Dutch criticism of cannabis activities in Albania by saying, “the seeds come from the 
Netherlands, technology comes from the Netherlands, and the market from the 
Netherlands.”170 
Depending on how one views the situation, Tirana’s frustration with the Dutch may 
have been justified but it was certainly not constructive with reference to Albania’s 
candidacy for EU membership. If Albania and the EU desire a successful future together, 
antagonistic rhetoric will not be the path to success. As previously mentioned, Albania’s 
efforts to reduce organized crime have been a focal point for the European Commission. 
The European Commission has also noted Albania’s efforts to combat the cannabis market, 
but it has not provided clarifications on exactly what must be accomplished. Must cannabis 
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cease to exist in Albania prior to membership, or is there a specific metric that must be 
attained? For a successful future to exist for both parties, the EU and Albania must 
explicitly address the cannabis market and all associated complications, and agree on 
exactly what milestones must be accomplished prior to membership and the expectations 
that will exist after membership. 
C. NATO AND ALBANIA 
Police launched operations into Lazarat in 2012 and 2014 to eliminate cannabis 
production. They met resistance in both operations, thwarting police efforts in 2012, and 
nearly again in 2014, when police were attacked by nearly 30 armed men.171 Lazarat, like 
many other villages that are centers for cannabis farming, had been taken over by organized 
crime. From an outside perspective, it may appear that the villagers were hostages to 
criminal organizations, but Arsovska contends that the issue is not that simple. She sees 
the issue as a more complicated social problem, arguing that many villagers, like those of 
Lazarat, potentially view underdevelopment and underemployment as greater threats than 
organized crime.172 
Albania is a member of NATO, so its domestic stability is important to the alliance, 
but NATO’s primary focus with reference to Albania must be on how the cannabis market 
can threaten regional stability. As discussed throughout this thesis, the Albanian cannabis 
market threatens domestic stability both economically and socially. For a military alliance 
focused on collective defense, these domestic threats to stability are outside NATO’s 
control. Although opinions such as Arsovska’s—that certain social conditions within 
Albania’s borders have turned parts of the population to organized crime—are bound to 
raise concerns for NATO, they are not a reason for panic. Albania is a pro-West, pro-
NATO country, and much of the civilian distrust toward government institutions is focused 
domestically and not internationally. Therefore, NATO’s focus on the Albanian cannabis 
market does not need to be on the domestic effects. Additionally, Albania’s extremely pro-
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West population and other factors suggest that the local cannabis market is unlikely to 
cause a global security threat by funding anti-Western terrorist groups—a point that will 
be thoroughly discussed in chapter IV. Lastly, as previously covered, the transnational 
organized crime associated with Albania’s cannabis market does cause stability issues for 
states which are consumers of the product, but those issues become domestic in nature and 
are again outside the purview of NATO. From NATO’s vantage point, the most likely 
threat from the cannabis market is its potential to inject funds into a regional conflict should 
one arise.  
The direct conflict in the Balkans has long since passed, but tension in the region 
has not diminished. According to Christopher Bennett, strong rhetoric from Serb 
authoritarian elites, often supported by Russia, has increased regional tensions.173 This is 
problematic for NATO as well as the EU. There are 4,300 NATO soldiers currently in 
Kosovo and 600 European Union Force (EUFOR) soldiers in Bosnia.174 Both institutions 
would like to see the region stabilize and be able to withdraw their forces, but if past is 
prologue, a return to conflict in the region would also witness a return of various non-state 
armed groups, similar to the KLA of the 1990s, complicating NATO’s and the EU’s 
missions. 
During the Kosovo conflict, the KLA fought a guerrilla campaign with a goal of an 
independent Kosovo state. The organization was considered a liberation army by some and 
viewed as a terrorist organization by others. In either case, they were armed and many of 
the arms used by the KLA were looted from Albania during the 1997 economic collapse.175 
It has also been claimed that the KLA funded its campaign through donations from other 
ethnic Albanians and drug-related operations.176 There is ample evidence to support the 
                                                 




175 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf-Christian Paes, Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and 
Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Skopje: Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), 
2001), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/16177/Brief_20.pdf, 13. 
176 Arsovska, Decoding Albanian Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization, 45. 
52 
former claim. According to Arsovska, most of the donations came from the Kosovo 
Albanian diaspora in Western Europe and the United States.177 As to the latter claim, it is 
based on rational thought more than actual evidence. One detailed brief about the KLA 
states that the source of some of its financing was “probably from drug lords” and that “it 
would be naive to assume that no ‘drug money’ was spent on the Kosovo war.”178 The 
KLA was peacefully demobilized and disarmed by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
following the cessation of hostilities in the Kosovo conflict, but the KFOR troops continued 
to find KLA weapons caches in subsequent years.179 
For NATO, the previous conflict in the Balkans and the various armed groups that 
took part in the struggle provide a cautionary tale. In the case of Kosovo, although the KLA 
was willing to demobilize, weapons were secretly kept by both Kosovo Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbs who felt insecure about their future safety.180 This is an example of the 
strong ethnic divisions that exist in Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans despite the presence 
of NATO forces. If drug operations were a source of funding to armed groups in the 
Balkans previously, the Albanian cannabis market poses a risk of doing the same in a future 
conflict. Therefore, it is in NATO’s best interest to maintain awareness about Albania’s 
cannabis market for the sake of regional stability.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The illicit transnational cannabis market is a complex problem for Albania and 
other countries. States are fearful of TOC, and evidence of the damage it can cause is well 
documented, but cannabis is often viewed as a harmless substance. This complicates the 
efforts of law enforcement authorities, and for this reason, it becomes a product useful to 
criminals because it can provide high profits at a relatively lower risk than other “hard” 
drugs. Albania’s cannabis market has been particularly damaging because it, along with 
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other TOC activities, has undercut global confidence in Tirana’s will and ability to combat 
it. This has had a ripple effect within the EU, which continues to delay membership talks 
as certain member states, including France and the Netherlands, resist expansion. For 
NATO, many of the problems the cannabis market creates within Albania are sources of 
concern, but outside the alliance’s purview. What it can focus on are the continuing efforts 
at maintaining regional stability in the Balkans and ensuring that the TOC created by the 
Albanian cannabis market does not interfere with that stability. 
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IV. THE UNLIKELY LINK BETWEEN TERRORISM AND 
ALBANIAN CANNABIS 
This chapter investigates potential links between the Albanian cannabis market and 
terrorist organizations, and it concludes that direct ties between Albanian cannabis and 
terrorism are possible but not probable. Many international institutions have voiced 
concerns about narcotics being used as a funding source for terrorist groups.181 Given the 
sheer enormity of the revenues produced from the illicit Albanian cannabis market, it is 
logical for these entities to suspect that part of the profits could have ties to terrorist 
organizations as well. 
In order to clarify why links between Albanian cannabis and terrorism are doubtful, 
this chapter examines historical accounts of where narcotics markets and terrorist activities 
have co-existed. In each case study, the primary condition that facilitated the development 
of links between narcotics and terrorism will be discussed. In the final sections of this 
chapter, those conditions will be compared to those in modern day Albania. This 
comparison will show that many of the enablers which have led to the intersection of 
narcotics and terrorism in other countries do not exist in Albania and will probably not do 
so for the foreseeable future. 
A. TERRORISM, TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND NARCO-
TERRORISM 
Examining links between narcotics and terrorist organizations is not a simple 
undertaking. Ideally, an investigation would start with a general consensus on what 
constitutes a terrorist organization, which first requires defining terrorism. This task can be 
daunting, because defining terrorism can be as complex as defining transnational organized 
crime (TOC). Andrew Silke and others have argued that “there is still no wide agreement 
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within academic circles on what exactly is meant by ‘terrorism.”182 John Horgan has 
reminded readers of the cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s patriot,” which 
succinctly points out how individual perceptions can add complexity to defining 
terrorism.183 In short, the waters of terrorism are muddied, and any attempt at providing a 
clear-cut definition of terrorism is likely to encounter some criticism. In order to avoid a 
tangential literature review, this chapter does not attempt to define terrorism specifically. 
Instead, it focuses on case studies that have been widely discussed with regard to links 
between narcotics and terrorism. This chapter accepts Conor Gearty’s view that the 
definition of terrorism “is moulded by government, the media and in popular usage, not by 
academic departments.”184 
This approach to defining terrorism—or not defining it, technically speaking—may 
appear sloppy but, in reality, it is a rational way to approach the subject at hand; that is, the 
link between the Albanian cannabis market and terrorist organizations. It is rational 
because, like definitions of terrorism, narratives on how narcotics fund terrorism are also 
often “moulded by government, the media and in popular usage.”185 
An example of this can be found in the Taliban case, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. Except for a relatively brief period in 1998 discussed in 
the next section, the Taliban provoked little interest among U.S. citizens until 9/11. After 
9/11, the Taliban were considered a terrorist organization by many American citizens and 
media outlets, and their link to the opium market in Afghanistan became prevalent in public 
discourse. Academically speaking, the accuracy of viewing the Taliban’s taxation of the 
opium market as “drug funded terrorism” can be challenged from a number of angles but 
that precision matters little to this chapter. That is because in the case of the Taliban, as in 
all other historical cases yet to be discussed, the factors that fostered the co-existence of 
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the narcotics market with activities labeled as terrorism do not exist in Albania and are not 
likely to arise. 
In a similar fashion to terrorism, the term narco-terrorism can also stir up debate. 
Again, the perfect accuracy of this term is not critical to this discussion. In the 1990s, author 
Rachel Ehrenfeld used narco-terrorism to reference scenarios of governments using drug 
trafficking to fund terrorism with the goal of undermining the United States.186 While links 
to drug trafficking and state-sponsored terrorism may fall in the realm of narco-terrorism, 
this chapter will focus on non-state actors. Admittedly, the Taliban fall into a gray area as 
they were essentially the governing body of Afghanistan for five years, but they were never 
represented at the United Nations. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter, narco-
terrorism will be used as a generic shorthand way to describe the “drug-terror nexus”187 
that exists when drug production, drug trafficking, or drug profits interact with non-state 
groups or activities labeled as terrorist organizations or terrorism respectively. 
Narco-terrorism occurs in two primary situations: when terrorists and drug 
traffickers co-exist, or when terrorists are also drug traffickers. The former situation will 
be discussed in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The latter situation will be split into 
two discussions. The first discussion—on Ireland—will show how a terrorist organization 
can become involved in illicit narcotics. The second discussion—on Colombia—gives an 
example of drug traffickers becoming terrorists. 
B. THE TALIBAN 
It can be argued that narco-terrorism in Afghanistan began in 1997 when opium 
production was sanctioned by the Taliban.188 This allowed them to tax its production as a 
form of revenue. Simultaneously, the Taliban were providing terrorist groups safe haven 
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within their borders, including the terrorist Osama bin Laden, who had lived there since 
1996.189 It is not clear how strong the relationship was between the Taliban and bin Laden 
by this point, but Time magazine reported that, upon his return to Afghanistan in 1996, bin 
Laden solidified his relationship with the Taliban by arranging the marriage of his daughter 
and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar.190 In any event, Afghanistan came under sanctions 
when the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden following the 1998 bombings of two 
American embassies in Africa.191 This refusal to give up bin Laden, while simultaneously 
profiting from the illicit opium market, pushed the Taliban over the narco-terrorism line, 
according to some authors.192 
However, narco-terrorism in Afghanistan did not become prominent in the public 
eye until after 9/11. Even after the 1998 embassy bombings, there were few, if any, global 
expressions of concern regarding the threat of narco-terrorism from Afghanistan. That 
began to change a month after the 9/11 attacks when the British government released a 
report stating that al-Qaeda was heavily funded through the drug trade in Afghanistan.193 
The accuracy of this report is questionable considering that the Taliban had issued a 
statewide ban on opium production in July 2000 which, with the assistance of a drought, 
had succeeded in eradicating most poppy crops from the country.194 Nevertheless, the 
narrative took hold and, in an ironic twist, was further fueled by the actions of the Taliban 
when they turned back to the opium market after being deposed.195 In 2004, Integrated 
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Regional Information Networks (IRIN)—the UN humanitarian news agency of the time—
reported on the Taliban using Afghanistan’s illicit opium market as a source of revenue.196 
The subject continued to gain momentum in the public sphere, and it has arguably become 
the premier poster-child for 21st-century narco-terrorism. 
The Taliban case provides an example of how illicit narcotics markets and terrorist 
organizations can co-exist. The Taliban were, at a minimum, supportive of bin Laden until 
9/11, as indicated by their refusal to extradite him in 1998. If that support qualifies the 
Taliban as a terrorist organization, Afghanistan provides an example of how a terrorist 
organization can co-exist with an illicit narcotics market. Both groups benefit from the 
arrangement because the terrorists tax the market to obtain revenue, while the drug 
entrepreneurs are allowed to operate without concerns of legal punishment. If the Taliban 
are not considered a terrorist organization, Afghanistan is still an example of co-existence 
because, within the Taliban territory, the opium market and terrorist organizations are both 
allowed to operate. 
In either narrative on Afghanistan, common ideology was the key factor that 
enabled narco-terrorism to exist. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban allowed multiple Arab 
Jihadist groups to train within their territory.197 The Taliban were a strict Salafi-
fundamentalist group198 so, ideologically speaking, it is safe to assume that they shared 
common ground with the terrorist groups. That being said, narcotics production or 
consumption is prohibited by the Qur’an. This fact might have been a point of contention 
for all parties involved, but the rule was circumvented on the basis that the narcotics 
produced were for Western kaffirs (unbelievers).199 Thus, the drug-terror nexus was fully 
justifiable because it either provided necessary funds for terrorist supporters (i.e., the 
Taliban are harboring terrorists), or it directly provided funds to terrorists (i.e., the Taliban 
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are terrorists), while simultaneously acting as a weapon against the perceived enemy of 
fundamentalist Islam (i.e., the West).  
C. THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES 
The protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, referred to as the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), began terrorist campaigns that 
would eventually transition into organized crime. The UVF dates back to the early 20th 
century. Protestant unionists formed an army to contest the British government’s approval 
of Irish self-government in 1912, and their rebellion resulted in the partition of Ireland in 
1920.200 The purpose of the UVF at the time was clear, but the purposes of its resurrection 
in 1966, and the formation of its follow-on counterpart, the UDA, are less apparent. The 
loyalists themselves claimed to be defending Protestants and Ulster from the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). Jonathan Tonge challenges this claim on the basis that the IRA 
was almost non-existent from the mid-1960s to 1970.201 Tonge asserts that the loyalist 
violence may have caused the British to fear an outbreak of civil war should they allow 
Northern Ireland to leave the UK. Assuming this is accurate, it could have been a 
motivating force for the UVF and UDA. While the true motivation behind the loyalist 
violence is debatable, the reality that terrorism was their primary tactic is not. In Northern 
Ireland’s Troubles, the authors provide data showing that the loyalists were responsible for 
the deaths of 983 people from 1969 to 1998. Among the victims, only 26 were members 
of the rival republican paramilitaries. An overwhelming 858 victims were civilians.202 
The UVF’s and UDA’s reliance on criminal activity was initially out of necessity. 
Unlike the IRA and Provisional IRA (PIRA), who had received weapons and funding from 
Irish-Americans,203 loyalist paramilitaries did not receive donations from abroad. They 
also did not have, nor seek, local support, although Tonge points out that the unionist public 
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did not exactly condemn their actions either.204 While the republican paramilitaries were 
funded through donations, taxes, some large robberies and money laundering, the loyalists 
had to rely on drugs, extortion and prostitution.205  
The loyalist transition point from being mainly terrorists to becoming drug 
traffickers came in the wake of the ceasefire in 1994. However, as early as the 1980s, signs 
that the necessary evils used to fund “the cause” were beginning to overtake “the cause” 
began to surface. The UDA’s chief fundraiser was killed by an Ulster freedom fighter in 
1989 following years of taking what were considered to be excessive amounts from the 
loyalist fundraising efforts.206 After the ceasefire in 1994, profiting from drug trafficking 
and other crimes was unnecessary because there was no longer a threat for loyalists to arm 
against. Nevertheless, according to Tamara Makarenko, the loyalists continued their 
criminal activities as their focus shifted from the original goals of defensive violence to 
maintaining financial sources.207 As a result, violence erupted between loyalist 
paramilitary groups, and within their ranks, as they struggled to control drug rackets and 
turf.208 The loyalists had ceased to be defenders of Protestants and had become drug 
traffickers. 
Ideology was the key factor that enabled narco-terrorism in Afghanistan, but in 
Northern Ireland, the enabling factor was the perception of an internal political threat along 
sectarian lines. Tonge presents convincing evidence that the UVF reemergence in 1966 had 
little to do with defending against an almost non-existent IRA. He explores multiple 
explanations for the whole Northern Ireland conflict, but in regard to why loyalists became 
terrorists, it is apparent that it was in reaction to the Catholics in the 1960s seeking greater 
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civil rights in Northern Ireland.209 In essence, what the loyalists were defending was the 
Protestant position in society. The necessity for an end state of a subdued Catholic minority 
justified the violent means required to achieve it, and the means to fund the violence 
through drug trafficking (i.e., narco-terrorism), among other crimes, were also justified by 
the end state.  
D. THE MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL 
Narco-terrorism in Colombia produced two versions of the drug-terror nexus. The 
first version consisted of terrorists becoming drug traffickers, similar to the loyalists of 
Northern Ireland. The second version emerged when drug traffickers became terrorists. 
The Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) constitute one of the most commonly 
referenced organizations among discussions of the former situation. The latter situation is 
best exemplified by the Medellin drug cartel, which will be the focus of this section. 
It should be noted that when referring to economic markets, the term cartel 
describes independent businesses that cooperate to fix prices and outputs.210 Some may 
contend that this does not accurately describe the operations of the Medellin drug cartel. 
Additionally, it can be argued that the word cartel does not accurately describe many drug 
trafficking networks commonly referenced in modern day public discourse. As with 
terrorism and narco-terrorism, the use of the word cartel, with respect to organized crime, 
has been shaped by society. This chapter uses the term only for ease of communication to 
describe one prominent drug trafficking organization that existed in Colombia from the 
late 1970s to the early 1990s. 
Two major cartels, the Cali cartel and the Medellin cartel, began their rise to power 
in the 1970s, but the latter is best known for its terror campaign against the state. The 
cartel’s main source of income, cocaine trafficking, dates back to the 1930s in Colombia, 
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but it received little U.S. attention until the 1960s.211 The most notorious member of the 
Medellin cartel, Pablo Escobar, entered into the business as a small time enforcer, but he 
moved his way up to establish a partnership with Fabio Ochoa and his sons in the late 
1970s, creating what became known as the Medellin cartel.212 Facing increasing anti-drug 
pressure from the Colombian government, Escobar turned to a combination of politics and 
political violence to protect his trade. Escobar funded a housing project entitled “Medellin 
without Slums,” which gained him strong local support and was instrumental in his election 
to the Colombian Congress in 1982.213 Behind the scenes, he enlisted armed groups both 
for protection and enforcement. According to Ehrenfeld, from 1982 to 1990, “Colombian 
drug cartels have killed over 1,000 public officials, 12 Supreme Court judges, more than 
500 judges, over 170 other judicial employees, dozens of journalists, a narcotics police 
chief, an attorney general, a major newspaper publisher, and 3 presidential candidates.”214 
It is unknown how many of those deaths can be attributed to Escobar. That being said, it is 
commonly accepted that between the two main cartels of the period, the Cali and Medellin 
cartels, the former was politically active primarily through non-violent means like bribery, 
while the latter engaged in a political terror campaign largely credited to Escobar.215 
The Medellin cartel example of narco-terrorism is associated with political 
violence, such as the loyalist paramilitary case, but with an opposite cause-effect 
relationship. In Northern Ireland, the loyalists saw the need to subdue a rising political 
threat as a justification for funding through illicit markets. Alternatively, in Colombia, the 
financial gains of the illicit market were the goal and terrorism was merely a political tool 
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to protect it. Thus, the three cases discussed demonstrate three different enablers of narco-
terrorism: ideology, politics motivated by sectarianism, and politics motivated by financial 
interests. Each enabler will be considered to examine the potential for narco-terrorism in 
Albania in the following section.  
E. IDEOLOGICAL NARCO-TERRORISM IN ALBANIA 
Among the three enablers of narco-terrorism previously discussed, ideology is the 
least applicable to Albania, yet it is of greatest concern to Western societies. With a few 
Internet searches, one can find reports about the violent Albanian mafia which is structured 
through Islam and utilizes violent tools like “honor killings”216 (likely a reference to the 
Albanian Kanun laws which have no basis in Islam217). Other articles have surfaced 
reporting that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) infiltrated the mountainous village 
of Lazarat, in Southern Albania, and took control of the cannabis market while 
simultaneously recruiting and radicalizing local residents.218 Arguably, the credibility of 
these sources can be challenged. However, in 2016, the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies (EUISS) reported that the Balkan countries are Europe’s top exporters of 
fighters to radical Islamic organizations, like ISIS, with Kosovo ranking first, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina ranking second, and Albania ranking fourth behind the non-Balkan state of 
Belgium.219 
These reports of ideological motivations may appear plausible upon first glance, 
but are quickly dispelled when Albania is carefully examined. Albania is a small state of 
2.8 million people. It is predominantly Muslim with some sources estimating the 
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percentage to be as high as 80 percent.220 This large majority is unique in Europe. This 
may explain why concerns over Islamic radicalization exist despite the research which 
shows the concerns are unsubstantiated. For example, Jana Arsovska, an expert on 
Albanian organized crime, provided detailed accounts of the rather insignificant influence 
of Islam on the daily lives of Albanian citizens.221 Her view of “Albanianism”—the idea 
that Albanians identify themselves first as being ethnically Albanian before identifying 
themselves with any religious faith—has been shared by other authors, such as those from 
the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) who released a 
2016 report about the decline in “Albanianism” in Kosovo.222 Although the report 
indicated concerns about ethnic Albanians in Kosovo becoming less secular, it did not 
make any assertion that the same trend was evident inside Albania. To further the point, a 
Washington think tank, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), rates the level of 
Islamist activity in Albania as low.223 
Concerns about large numbers of Albanians joining the ranks of ISIS are also 
misguided when carefully examined. According to the EUISS, Albania’s contribution of 
110 fighters to ISIS as of 2016 placed it just behind Belgium in fighters per capita. The 
report implies, or more accurately asserts, that Balkan countries are susceptible to 
radicalization because of their large Muslim populations. The statistics cited raise concern 
until one examines the demographics of each state. As previously mentioned, Albania’s 
population of 2.8 million is predominantly Muslim. In comparison, Belgium’s population 
of 11.3 million224 is estimated to be only 7.6 percent Muslim. If one believes the argument 
that Albania’s predominantly Muslim population makes its citizens susceptible to 
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radicalization, then it stands to reason that its fighters per capita should greatly exceed 
those of Belgium. It is true that any European citizen volunteering to join the ranks of ISIS 
is of grave concern. However, the fact that Albania produces fewer fighters per capita than 
a state with a substantially smaller Muslim population percentage refutes the notion that 
Albanians located within Albania are especially susceptible to radicalization because of 
their religious demographics. 
It is unlikely that the ideological narco-terrorism that occurred in Afghanistan will 
occur in Albania. It would be difficult to find a modern democracy completely void of 
radicals, but Albania as a whole is relatively secure from such a radical ideology. The 
Taliban governed most of Afghanistan while in power. They permitted the illicit opium 
market on the grounds that it only hurt non-Muslims while simultaneously engaging in 
terrorism, or supporting terrorists, depending on one’s perspective. Evidence that the 
common anti-West ideology that prevailed among the governing Taliban and the jihadist 
groups within their territory exists, or may develop, in Albania is lacking. To the contrary, 
it can be argued that Albania is one of the most pro-Western Muslim countries in the world 
both governmentally and among its citizens. Therefore, ideological narco-terrorism is not 
a significant concern in Albania’s foreseeable future. 
F. SECTARIAN NARCO-TERRORISM IN ALBANIA 
Like ideological narco-terrorism, the political narco-terrorism witnessed in 
Northern Ireland has little in common with current circumstances in Albania. The violence 
in Northern Ireland stemmed from a perception that a minority of the population was 
threatening the political status quo. Additionally, the division between the majority and 
minority had sectarian origins. In Albania, the population is very homogeneous with over 
80 percent being ethnically Albanian,225 but dialects divide Albanians between two main 
groups, the majority being Tosks and the minority being Ghegs.226 After the fall of 
communism, there were complaints that President Sali Berisha, a Gheg, was replacing 
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many Tosks with fellow Ghegs.227 Additionally, Arsovska has also found evidence of 
Albanian organized crime groups in Western Europe aligning along Gheg and Tosk 
lines.228 Albania is known to be tribal and clan-based in some respects, but politically there 
does not appear to be evidence of a continuous sectarian divide that had briefly appeared 
in the early 1990s. 
Hypothetically, if the Albanian Tosks were to see the Ghegs as a political threat, 
the environment in Albania might resemble that in Northern Ireland. Most southern 
Albanians are Tosks, and southern Albania is where the majority of cannabis cultivation 
initially took place. In this counterfactual scenario, a Tosk paramilitary group would 
require funding for its terror campaign, and a logical source would be the large cannabis 
market run by their fellow Tosks. 
This is where the hypothetical vignette diverges from the circumstances in Northern 
Ireland and why it is not probable. In Northern Ireland, the loyalists mobilized first and 
then began illicit markets to fund their activities. In Albania, the cannabis market is already 
established with annual revenues estimated to be as much as $6 billion.229 Thus, the Tosks 
involved in the cannabis market would probably prefer to avoid anything that could disrupt 
their trade. Angela Gendron’s book chapter, “Transnational Organized Crime and 
Terrorism,” acknowledges that the crime-terror nexus faces multiple barriers.230 In this 
theoretical case, the dominant barrier would be the criminal organization’s desire to 
maintain the status quo. A terrorist campaign along sectarian lines funded by drug 
trafficking would certainly attract global attention and not be good for business. 
G. FINANCIAL NARCO-TERRORISM IN ALBANIA 
Perhaps the case that most closely relates to the current environment in Albania is 
that of the Colombian Medellin cartel of the 1970s-1990s. In both the Colombian case and 
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in Albania today, one can see powerful drug trafficking organizations located within states 
that suffer from law enforcement deficiencies and high levels of corruption. Another 
parallel is that the government of Albania, in its quest to join the EU, receives mounting 
pressure to crackdown on its illicit cannabis market—evident by the annual reviews of its 
potential membership.231 This is similar to the intensifying pressure Colombia received 
from the United States to rein in its cocaine market. The Colombian government’s reaction 
to the pressure from the United States (i.e., attacking the source of cocaine) was similar to 
the Albanian government’s current efforts to eradicate cannabis from the country’s 
southern regions.232 These parallels can lead one to conclude that the current state of affairs 
in Albania may result, in some circumstances, in a financially motivated political terror 
campaign against the state, if the cannabis traffickers find themselves without better 
options. 
Nevertheless, there are factors that lessen the probability of financial narco-
terrorism erupting in Albania, despite the correlation between the current state of Albanian 
affairs and the past events in Colombia. The primary differences are in the geography and 
societal structures of the two countries. Geography is the most obvious difference. 
Colombia is roughly 39 times the size of Albania. Both countries are mountainous, but 
Columbian terrain is significantly harsher and inhospitable. The Andes Mountains in 
Colombia divide into separate chains and consist of multiple mountain peaks exceeding 
18,000 feet.233 In comparison, Albania’s mountains are generally over 1,000 feet with the 
tallest mountain in Eastern Albania reaching 9,000 feet.234 The extreme size and dramatic 
topography of Colombia create a country with widely isolated areas. Albania has isolated 
areas as well, but not to the same extreme as Colombia. As Francisco Thoumi explains, 
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Colombia’s geography made territorial law enforcement very difficult, as it “was formed 
as a collection of regions with little communication and trade exchanges among them.”235 
Societal structure also reduces the potential for financial narco-terrorism in 
Albania. As mentioned before, Albania is largely a homogeneous society, and the 
differences between the Ghegs and Tosks do not create political friction. The same cannot 
be said of Colombia. The country has had a long history of violence, often instigated by 
significant regional heterogeneity.236 Both countries suffer from corrupt governments, 
which lead to a lack of trust among the population; but, unlike Albania, where Albanianism 
creates a national identity among the population, the diversity in Colombia has created 
barriers to the establishment of a national Colombian identity. Lastly, the desire of an 
overwhelming majority of Albanians to integrate with Western nations and attain 
membership in the EU indicates that they do not suffer from the natural resistance to 
government that was seen in Colombia. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Narco-terrorism is a phenomenon that is largely feared but not well understood. 
Statements such as “it is well established that there are terrorists and non-State armed 
groups profiting from the drug trade”237 from reputable institutions, like the UNODC, 
produce little doubt among the public that it is something to be taken seriously. However, 
these definitive statements become less convincing when other organizations, such as the 
European Union, report on the need to document “potential connections between drug 
trafficking and the financing of terrorist groups and activities” because there is a “lack of 
solid evidence.”238 These reports give the impression that the causes of crimes are being 
determined before there is evidence of a crime. 
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Such may be the case in Albania, where there is an undeniable co-existence of a 
Muslim majority and a hugely profitable drug trade. If it is assumed that Muslims are 
susceptible to radicalization and that large-scale illicit drug operations fund terrorism, 
narco-terrorism appears inevitable in Albania. All that remains is finding the evidence of 
the crime. 
The danger of these assumptions is that law enforcement officials may end up 
jumping to conclusions and chasing the wrong evidence. In response, governments may 
end up pursuing the wrong reforms. As discussed, of the three motivating factors for narco-
terrorism, ideology is the least relevant to Albania. If anything, the focus should be on 
avoiding a scenario like the one that transpired in Colombia from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
as that scenario has the most parallels to the Albanian situation. This starts by building trust 
in the national government by stamping out corruption. Next, Albania must continue to 
promote the strong national identity that is shared by the majority of the population. Lastly, 
in the government’s quest to eradicate cannabis cultivation, it cannot be overlooked that 
alternative sources of revenue must be available. The predominantly agricultural villages 
of the south rely on cannabis as the primary source of income. The most likely enabler of 
a narco-terrorism scenario erupting in Albania would result from ignoring this reality. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Transnational organized crime (TOC) can be difficult to define and challenging to 
combat. However, no matter how it is defined, TOC is a global threat. Some states will 
suffer greater effects than others, but no state is guaranteed to be immune. Less developed 
states are particularly vulnerable to TOC due to economic challenges and weak state 
institutions. Such is the case in Albania, where TOC has persisted since its entrance into 
the democratic world in the early 1990s.  
Albanian cannabis production and trafficking have been able to spread thanks to a 
difficult transition to democracy orchestrated by politicians that have prioritized 
consolidating power over pursuing the democratic rule of law. As a result, the illicit market 
has contributed to a wide range of harmful effects. Internally, it has disturbed the social 
structure of villages and promoted corruption, which in turn has eroded state institutions. 
Moreover, it has fostered informal economies that have promoted further crime while 
taking away from the regulated market economy. Tirana has made great strides to eradicate 
cannabis plantations, but even if the crop is totally eliminated, it will have lingering effects 
on Albanian stability.  
Externally, the cannabis market is a branch of TOC that is problematic for outside 
countries and of particular concern to the EU. Cannabis is a profitable industry, and 
trafficking it comes with less risk than that of “hard” drugs. This creates easier access into 
consumer countries where governments have decriminalized its use and whose citizens 
may see the substance as less harmful than alternative drugs. However, the perceived 
harmlessness of cannabis at the individual level does not negate the harmful effects it has 
at the state level. The reputation of Albania and its people has suffered from the negative 
effects, including the publicity the cannabis market and other organized crime activities 
have produced. This has likely caused some bias among outside governments and law 
enforcement authorities which is counterproductive to cooperation. In order for countries 
to establish the best policies with respect to the Albanian cannabis market, they must ensure 
that they look past pre-existing biases and work with Albanian authorities toward a 
common end-state.  
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Under pressure from the EU, Albanian officials have increased enforcement against 
the cannabis market, but TOC groups have adapted. As early as 2010, well before the 2012 
and 2014 operations in Lazarat, the UNODC was reporting on “an increasing trend of 
indoor cannabis cultivation.”239 This development was prophetic as cutting off cannabis 
at the source has become increasingly difficult in recent years even as outdoor cultivation 
in Albania has been significantly reduced. Such developments have raised questions among 
EU member states about Tirana’s commitment to combatting the cannabis market and have 
reinforced assumptions of corruption. There is little doubt that the cannabis market is a 
contributing factor in the EU’s recent decision to delay Albania’s membership talks by yet 
another year.  
Any transnational drug trafficking will create global concerns because drug 
trafficking is considered to be a potential funding source for non-state armed groups and 
terrorist organizations. This may cause trepidation for NATO. Albania is a NATO ally, 
which makes its stability a point of importance for the alliance. While it behooves the allies 
to stay abreast of the internal developments within Albania, their focus as a defensive 
alliance must be on stability in the Balkans as a whole. The Albanian cannabis market 
creates a wrinkle in this plan. Although it is unlikely to become a funding source for radical 
terrorist organizations, the potential for the cannabis market to be used as a funding source 
for armed groups in the Balkans, should old conflicts resurface, is genuine.  
In the end, the Albanian cannabis market will survive as long as the Albanian 
population allows it to. It will most likely never be eliminated completely, but if the will is 
there, it can be reduced to insignificant levels. The question is whether it will continue to 
factor into the EU’s decision about Albanian candidacy for membership. Moreover, how 
long will the citizens of Albania be willing to wait for acceptance into the EU? 
Apprehension by some EU member states regarding expansion is understandable, but there 
are risks associated with delaying too long. The most logical way for the EU and other 
countries to determine how to move forward with Albania is to look back at its past. For 
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nearly three decades, the small state has progressed, despite bitter partisan politics, 
economic collapse, large waves of emigration, widespread corruption, and organized 
crime. Its military has been raised to NATO standards, and its economy has transitioned 
from being the poorest state in Europe to becoming one of the fastest growing economies. 
Albania has proven itself to be persistent. Considering those factors and the fact that the 
population is extremely pro-West, the benefits Western countries stand to gain by engaging 
with Albania likely outweigh the risks posed by its cannabis market. 
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